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Abstrakt
Tato práce je zaměřena na použití bio-insipirovaných algoritmů v oblasti evoluce malwaru. V
úvodu práce je seznámení s problematikou malwaru a problematikou evolučních algoritmů. Dále
je zde popis vytvořeného počítačového viru, využívajícího evoluční techniky a principy mod-
ulárního programování. V poslední části této práce je popsán proběhlý experiment, a také jeho
výsledky.
Klíčová slova: malware, virus, evoluční algoritmy, modulární programování, diplomová práce
Abstract
The aim of this work is focused on using bio-inspired algorithms in field of malware evolu-
tion. In the beginning of this work is introduction with malware and evolutionary algorithms
problematic. Next part of this work contains description of created computer virus, which
uses evolutionary techniques and modular programming principles. In last part of this work is
described experiment performed in this work and its results.
Key Words: malware, virus, evolution algorithms, modular programming, master thesis
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1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Due to the ever-expanding number of computer systems, there is, and there will be more and
more malware targeting these systems. Evolvable malware looks very interesting and terrifying
at the same time. Not only that evolvable malware will be heavy challenge for anti-virus prod-
ucts because anti-viruses in these days still using as a core part of recognizing malware pattern
matching and evolvable malware will change its signature (whole or particularly) in every gen-
eration. But it will be challenging for heuristic part of anti-viruses too because malware will be
able to change its behaviour too.
1.2 Looking on evolvable malware
We can look at evolvable malware in two different views.
First view is that we can look on it as the type of malware defense against anti-viruses.
In history we see that there is some kind of malware defense evolution. We can divide this
defense to five categories and as next (six) category in this camouflage evolution we can consider
evolvable malware. These five categories are shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Malware camouflage evolution
Source: [4]
The second view is that how we can look on behaviour of malware. Because evolvable
malware can adapt to environment it can be interesting to see malware which can "decide"
that for better accomplishment of the given task it will be better to change its behaviour. For
example we can have malware which task will be "make money". That malware can in some
environment mine bitcoins (e.g. machine with good HW) and the same malware in the other
environment can act as ransomware (e.g. machine with many documents on disk).
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2 State of the art
2.1 Brief history
As first concepts on computer viruses can be considered John von Neumann’s self-reproducing
mathematical automata in the 1940s and in 1951 Neumann shows methods how to create this
automata. Malicious software (malware) started to be popular with the expansion of computer
networks. Before that, malware existed too but was not so widely spread because there was not
such opportunity as is with computer networks.
Nowadays malicious software primary exploits Microsoft Windows. In the following lines
will be described a brief history of evolving malicious software over the last few decades.
2.1.1 1960s
In 1962 group of engineers (V. Vyssotsky, G. McIlroy, R. Morris) created game "Darwin" which
goal was to battle about computer using programs and multiply against opponents programs.
Players need to eliminate opponents programs to win the game.
2.1.2 1970s
Early in 1970s was detected virus "Creeper" on US military network called "ARPANET". Creeper
was written on Tenex OS and was capable to copy itself through modem to remote location.
Infected system displayed message "I’M THE CREEPER : CATCH ME IF YOU CAN.".
Shortly after that was created virus "Reaper" which goal was to delete "Creeper" virus. It
is unclear if this virus was written by the same person as "Creeper" or it was work of someone
else.
In 1974 virus "Rabbit" was created. It gets its name by the payload it does. Rabbits only
payload was to multiply and spread, but it was doing it so fast that performance issues occurred.
In 1975 was created "Pervading Animal" game in which player think of animal and game
tries to identify it. When the game was unable to guess the animal its update itself and enter
new questions. This updated version overwrites old one and copies itself to other directories. It
is unclear if it was a malicious intention of the author or if it was badly programmed program.
2.1.3 1980s
In 1981 virus "Elk Cloner" was created. This virus was infecting Apple II OS. The virus started
when the computer was booted from an infected floppy disk. When was inserted non-infected
floppy disk the virus copies itself on it. As a payload virus uses rotating images, blinking text
and joke messages.
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In 1983 was term "virus" used in connection with self-replication computer program by L.
Eidelmen and showed at seminar virus-like program. In 1984 L. Eidelmen defined computer
virus as program which is able infect other programs and replicate itself to them.
In 1986 was created virus "Brain". Virus spread itself on IBM compatible systems and in a
few month world outbreak erupted. Brain uses boot sector for infection. Authors of virus (B.F.
Alvi and his brother Amjad) worked in sales for a software company in Pakistan. The virus
contained theirs names and phone number. Virus "Brain" can be marked as the first "stealth"
virus - in case that someone wants to show boot sector, the virus shows original uninfected boot
sector.
In 1986 (in the same year as Brain) was released virus named "Virdem" by R. Burger (german
programmer). His virus was able to copy itself by adding its code to code executable DOS files
in COM format.
In 1987 several viruses were created.
• Vienna - its payload shows Christmas tree.
• Lehigh - installing itself to memory from infected disk with COMMAND.COM file.
• Suriv virus family
• Boot sector viruses: Yale, Stoned, Ping Pong
• Cascade - first self-encrypted virus. The virus consists of body and encryption routine.
Virus payload was that text of screen cascade down and form a heap on the bottom.
In 1988 virus Jerusalem (Suriv-3) was released. This virus was memory resistant and inflicted
every executable file. This virus also had payload which triggers on 13th Friday except in the
year 1987. When a condition is met virus delete every file that was executed.
In the same year (1988) was released computer worm Morris. This worm exploited known
vulnerabilities on Unix and harvest passwords. The virus sends an unlimited number of copies of
itself and completely overloaded the networks. The overall losses were estimated to $96 million
dollars[10].
In 1989 was released WANK worm. Worm spread via DECnet protocol. Worm payload was
message "WORMS AGAINST NUCLEAR KILLERS" and "Your System Has Been Officially
WANKed.". This worm also changed system password and sent it to user "GEMPAK" on SPAN
network.
In the same year was released "AIDS" trojan. 20000 disc were sent as Aids Information
Diskette. After infected disk was loaded trojan installs itself on the system and start to conceal
files and directories and modify system files. After 90 loads trojan leaves only one file visible
which contains information to pay money to the bank account.
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2.1.4 1990s
In 1990 the first polymorphic virus was released. Virus family Chameleon was encrypted, but
on top of that, it changes virus code with every infection.
In July 1990 DiskKiller virus was infected on a free floppy disc which was in PC Today
computer magazine. More than 50000 were sold.
Frodo virus appears in 1990 too it uses stealth techniques to hide. Its payload was message
"FRODO LIVES!" with pattern moving around.
Whale virus released in 1990, it was 9,216 bytes large virus which uses multiple encryption
and other advanced stealth techniques to hide itself in system.
In 1991 was created virus "Tequila" it was polymorphic boot infector, causing an epidemic.
This virus was written by a Swiss programmer for research purposes but was stolen by acquain-
tance and spread.
In 1992 was created virus "Peach" which was one of the first retroviruses. It deletes the
database of antivirus, so antivirus "thinks" that it is launched first time and recreate the whole
database slowly again. This way Peach can slowly inflict system without being noticed.
In the same year (1992) was created the first Windows virus "Win.Vir_1_4".
In 1994 were created viruses "SMEG.Pathogen" and "SMEG.Queeg". It were highly poly-
morphic viruses which causes data loses (viruses overwrite part of the disk).
In 1996 was created the first virus for Windows 95 named "Boza". It affects Windows
executable files (EXE). Boza infects 3 EXE files in the directory where is launched and after
that launch original file. Boza payload is windows with a message containing information about
virus writers.
In July 1996 was founded first Microsoft excel virus which uses macros written in Visual
Basic programming language.
In February 1997 the first virus for Linux appeared named "Bliss".
In March 1997 appeared virus "ShareFun" which was the first kind of virus which uses
spreading via email.
In April 1997 virus "Homer" appeared it was the first network worm which uses FTP to
propagate itself through the network.
In January 1999 appeared worm "Happy99" which caused global epidemic. It uses MS
Outlook to spread itself. Worm shows animated firework as its payload and modify registry to
start after system boot.
In December 1999 first self-rejuvenation worm appeared. It was worm Babylonia. Worm was
capable of download newer version of its modules from remote location from Japan. It connects
to server to Japan every minute to check if there is newer version of its modules and if there
were it download and install them.
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2.1.5 2000s
In May 2000 appeared virus LoveLetter. The virus was written in visual basic and spread by
email as "LOVE-LETTER-FOR-YOU.TXT.vbs" attachment. The virus then set homepage of
Internet Explorer to one of the predefined and from there downloaded another its part which
placed itself in Windows system directory and harvest sensitive information from the computer
and sent it to specified email address.
In September 2000 appeared virus named "Stream" which was able to work with ADS (al-
ternate data stream) of NTFS file system.
In November 2000 appeared virus "Hybris" which was enhanced virus Babylonia. The main
enhancement was the use of websites and list of servers and using 128-bit RSA key for identifying
modules.
In 2001 appears "fileless" worms. These worms exist only in RAM, and it doesn’t need files
to replicate and spread itself.
In the same year appeared worm Code Red. This worm exploits a vulnerability in Microsoft
IIS and causes DDoS attacks on several fixed IP addresses.
In 2002 Linux worm Slapper appeared and infected thousand Linux systems. The worm
used a vulnerability in OpenSSL through connection to Apache.
On January 25th, 2003, worm Slammer appeared. This worm caused increased traffic over
the network by 40 % - 80 % and inflicted hundreds of thousand computers within a few minutes.
Slammer exploited buffer overflow in Microsoft SQL server (patch for this vulnerability was
available half of the year at the time of worm started to spread).
In August 2003 Blaster (Lovesan) worm appeared. The worm used buffer overflow to spread
itself and caused DDoS attack on website windowsupdate.com which was in fact only redirecting
page to windowsupdate.microsoft.com.
In January 2004 email worm Bagle appeared. Bagle was used to create Trojan proxy servers
on victim machines.
In April 2004 worm Sasser appeared. Sasser exploited loophole in LSASS (Local Security Au-
thority Subsystem Service) in Microsoft Windows. Sasser paralyzed many businesses including
banks, airlines, hospitals etc.
In October 2005 was discovered rootkit which uses Sony company on their discs to prevent
illegal copying. When disc was inserted to pc it installs software which modify operating system
to make copying discs harder. This rootkit created vulnerabilities which were immediately used
by virus writers.
In November 2008 worm Conficker appeared. Conficker used many advanced malware tech-
niques. It uses RPC (remote procedure call) exploit which contains exploit to buffer overflow
which then downloaded worm as .jpg file. After worm was on victim systems it checks its public
IP address by using on of the several website for this purpose. After that Conficker create HTTP
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server on random port, infect another victim and let the victim download Conficker from newly
created HTTP server.
2.1.6 2010s
In June 2010 Stuxnet worm was detected. Stuxnet targeted only specific devices (Siemens cen-
trifuges) causing them to self-destruct. Stuxnet used 4 "zero-day" vulnerabilities to its operation
and had switch off date which was set on June 24, 2012. Stuxnet was able infect not only using
network, but can infect systems using removable devices too.
In September 2013 ransomware "Cryptolocker" appeared. It is considered as one of the first
ransomware. It was spread by zip attachments in email. In zip archive was EXE file which was
named *.pdf.exe and has pdf icon. After launch Cryptolocker start encrypts victim files and
demanded ransom to be paid to unlock files. It was one of the ransomware that actually gave
to user decryption key if ransom was paid.
In 2015 Bashlite malware appeared exploiting "Shellshock" software bug and causing several
DDoS attacks.
In 2016 ransomware Locky appeared. It was contained as macro of Microsoft Word document
pretending to be an invoice.
In September 2016 botnet Mirai showed its capability. Mira caused several massive DDoS
attacks (to 1Tbit/s). Mirai abused the fact that on many IoT devices were never changed
login credentials. Mirai load itself to memory and after loaded it deletes itself from disk so
theoretically after the reboot was device free of virus, but in time of attacks, device was again
infected in a few minutes after reboot if credentials remain unchanged.
In 2017 another ransomware appeared. Ransomware WannaCry and Petya used leaked NSA
hacking tools to exploits to targeted systems. Both mentioned used EternalBlue exploit which
was exploiting a vulnerability in Microsoft SMB protocol for remote code execution.
2.2 Current state of the art
2.2.1 Metamorphic malware
Metamorphic viruses are viruses that are one of the most advanced and complicated viruses
and may be labeled as the best (in term of advanced techniques and difficulty to detect them)
viruses yet. Theses viruses using advance techniques to be able to change its structure. This
includes abilities to edit and rewrite its code, but remain its functionality. Due to this fact it is
very hard to detect a metamorphic virus by its signature because the signature is changing over
time.
Changing structure is performed by metamorphic operations such as register usage exchange,
code permutation, code expansion, code shrinking and insertion of garbage code.
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Register usage exchange is a technique where are in different iterations of virus used different
registers, so functionality remains the same, but the code is different due to usage of different
registers.
Code permutation is a technique where virus code is divided into frames which can be
permuted. The virus then ensures that these frames are executed in the correct order.
Code expansion is a technique where the virus will expand its logic to more instructions, but
ensure that logic remains the same.
Code shrinking is a technique which is similar to expansion, but instead of expanding to
more instructions it is shrunk to less instructions. This technique is quite hard because in fact
to get less instructions with the same functionality it is needed to optimize code.
Inserting garbage code is a technique where it is inserted garbage instructions which do
nothing in term of functionality, but the code is changed.
These techniques listed above provide metamorphic malware with certain resilience against
signature-based scanning of anti-malware programs.
2.2.2 Evolving malware
Current evolvable malware is in the its beginning. There were not many experiments in this
field at least what author know. But that few which were done we could actually consider as
current state of the art.
We may see that sometimes is metamorphic malware labeled as evolvable malware. Author
opinion is that we cannot label metamorphic malware as evolvable malware. Metamorphic
malware is malware which changes its structure in every iteration to camouflage itself, but
evolutionary algorithms are not necessarily needed for this purpose, and it can be achieved
without them.
In one of the experiment done by S. Noreen, S. Murtaza, M. Z. Shafiq, M. Farooq. They
wrote evolutionary framework for evolving malware. In their experiment they were trying evolve
virus based on virus family "Bagle".[2]
Another experiment was done by A. Cani, M. Gaudesi, E. Sanchez. Where they were working
with the code of the virus "Timid". In their experiment they used genetic algorithm to find best
place to inject virus code into PE application.[3]
In the light of these few experiments, we can say that current state of the art of evolvable
malware is ability to use evolution in its part or to use evolution as a tool to change the way
how is virus working but still remaining its origin functionality.
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3 Theoretical part
Theoretical part of this work is divided to 4 sections. These section are: Evolutionary algorithms,
Types of malware, Virus defense techniques and past experiments.
3.1 Evolutionary algorithms
In this thesis are used evolutionary algorithms for generating malware blocks and simulating
evolution. There are used 4 algorithms: PSO, SOMA, DE and GA. We will describe each of
them more in the following paragraphs.
3.1.1 PSO
Particle swarm optimization is optimization technique which works with population like genetic
algorithms. This technique was founded by Russel Eberhart and James Kennedy in 1995 and
its inspired by social behaviour of animal communities like bird and fish swarm.
Unlike some other evolutionary algorithms the particle swarm does not use selection. The
problem solving is done by interactions between all population members which results in im-
proving solution over time.
3.1.1.1 Principle
As it was said particle swarm is simulating behaviour of animal swarms like bird. We can easily
imagine its function as swarm of birds which are looking for the highest place to sit. Each bird
in the swarm is represented as particle in PSO. Birds don’t know where the highest place is, but
they know where is the highest bird from the swarm. So the others birds (particles in PSO) will
follow its direction.
The same principle is used in PSO algorithm. All particles have their coordinates in searched
space, their velocity and they all know their last best position. The best position is determined
using the fitness function.
The first population in PSO is initialized randomly with randomly chosen parameters (ve-
locity vector, coordinates) and it is computed by fitness function their value. The best particle
is stored in shared memory so each particle can know where is the best solution yet. This value
in population is called "gBest" (g-global).
After each iteration, all particles will compare its actual fitness value with its previous
personal best value, and if the actual fitness value is better, it will be replaced by new best
value. And then all particles will recalculate the velocity vector and position.
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When all particles known their personal best (pBest) and global best (gBest) they will
recalculate their velocity vector and position using Equation 1 and Equation 2.
vd(t+ 1) = vd(t) + c1 ∗ rand ∗ (pBesti,d − xi,d(t)) + c2 ∗ rand ∗ (gBestd − xi,d(t)) (1)
xi,d(t+ 1) = xi,d(t) + vd(t+ 1) (2)
Where:
vd(t+ 1) - velocity of particle in the next step
vd(t) - velocity of particle in the current step
xi,d(t+ 1) - position of particle in the next step
xi,d(t) - position of particle in the current step
pBesti,d - the current best position of the current particle
gBestd - the current best position in the population
rand - random number in interval (0, 1)
c1, c2 - learning factors (usually it is 2)
We can say that particles can take 3 ways (shown in Figure 2):
• Individual: particles continue on their way
• Conservative: particles return to its current best position
• Adaptive: particle follow particle which found the current best global position
Figure 2: Particle moves influenced by its trends
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3.1.1.2 Algorithm
Principle of PSO can be demonstrated in pseudo-code (Listing 1). In this example we are not
checking if particles are in searched space nor if particle velocity exceeds max velocity.
{
Input:
iteration: number of iterations
particles: number of particles p_i
gBest: best founded solution in population
pBest: best founded solution of current particle
}
{ random initialization }
for j =< particles do
begin
p_j = rand_j
end
for i < iteration do
begin
for j =< particles do
begin
{ calculate speed of particle (equation 1) }
{ calculate positon of particle (equation 2) }
fitness = fitness_function(p_i)
if fitness < pBest then
begin
pBest = fitness
end
if pBest < gBest then
begin
gBest = pBest
end
end
end
Listing 1: PSO pseudocode
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3.1.1.3 Adjustable parameters
• Dimension – number of inputs to fitness function. Dimension of solving problem.
• Range - boundaries of searched space.
• Particle count - number of particles (population size). Recommended value is 10×
dimension.
• Vmax - maximal velocity of particles. Recommended value is 1/20 of range.
• Learning factors c1, c2 - these learning factors influences trend of particles moves, but
this influence is only partial. Factor c1 is preference to returns back to "pBest". Factor
Factor c2 is preference to move to "gBest". Usually are both factors set to value 2.
• Inertia weight (w) - small value of inertia support searching local extremes and big
value of inertia support searching of global extremes. Inertia weight (Equation 4) is used
in calculation of next step velocity (Equation 3).
vd(t+ 1) = w ∗ vd(t) + c1 ∗ rand ∗ (pBesti,d − xi,d(t)) + c2 ∗ rand ∗ (gBestd − xi,d(t)) (3)
w = wstart − (wstart − wend) ∗ Iteration
Migration
(4)
Where:
Iteration - number of round in migration rounds
Migration - total amount of migration rounds
wstart - starting inertia weight (usually 0.9)
wend - ending inertia weight (usually 0.4)
• Constriction factor - some PSO version using this instead of inertia. This factor has
similar effects to inertia. Usual value is 0.729.
3.1.1.4 PSO disadvantages
• Often happens that too much initial velocity is generated and thus particles move away
from best solution quickly. (Solved by limitation of max velocity).
• On problems with many optimums algorithm has tendency to premature convergence.
• Too many adjustable parameters.
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3.1.1.5 Other versions of PSO
• Neighborhood - version of PSO which aiming to limit premature convergence.
• Speciation - version of PSO which introduces particles "species".
• Niching - version of PSO which creating sub-swarms to searching on local extremes while
rest of swarm continues in searching further off.
• INPSO - Independent Neighborhoods Particle Swarm Optimization - this version using
more neighborhoods which are independent of each other.
• Hybrid - combination of INSPO and GPEA (Geometrical Place Evolutionary Algo-
rithm).
• Dynamic Neighborhood - version in which are particles in independent neighborhoods,
but particles can change its neighborhood.
3.1.2 SOMA
SOMA is an algorithm which is based on vector operations like in scatter search, differential
evolution or particle swarm optimization. So we can classify this algorithm as a swarm algorithm.
Due to the philosophy of algorithm, the "classic" generation is there called migration, but in
fact it has the same meaning as the generation.
In biology analogy, we can say that its harem like reproduction system in swarm rather than
a classic way of choosing parents from population for crossover.
3.1.2.1 Principle
SOMA was founded on the principle, which we can see in nature. It is inspired by competitive-
cooperation behaviour of intelligent individuals solving a specific problem. We can see this type
of behaviour in nature in various forms, for example, ants, bees, predators hunting in packs etc.
In the competitive phase is each individual trying to find the best solution to the given
problem (e.g. find food).
In cooperation phase are individuals telling each other their quality (e.g. how much food
they found) and they try to adapt their behaviour to be better in the next migration.
These two phases are continually repeating until end condition will occur. By these 2 simple
phases we get simple model of this algorithm.
Before we start the algorithm we need to setup initial controlling parameters. These param-
eters are:
• PathLength - (1; 5] - this parameter determine how far is active individual stop from
leader individual. If PathLength is equal to 1, active individual will stop exactly on
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location of leader individual. If is this parameter greater than 1 active individual will stop
behind leader and vice versa. Recommended value is 3.
• Step - [0.11;PathLength] - this parameters determine how fine or rough is sampling. The
less the value is the better is chance to find global extreme, but the more resources (cost
function calling) it costs. It is recommended to set this so it isn’t integer multiple of
distance (PathLength) between leader and active individual or our active individual can
end exactly at leader location and diversibility of population will be lesser.
• PRT - [0, 1] - PRT mean perturbation. This controlling parameter affects creating per-
turbation vector (PRTVector), which influences direction of which individual is heading
when going to leader. If set to 1 active individual will take direct way (route) to leader.
Recommended value is 0.1.
• D - Dimension of the given problem (number of arguments in cost function).
• PopSize - [10;userdefined] - number of individuals in population. Recommended value
is between (0.2×D) to (0.5×D) if D is high enough.
• Migration - [10;userdefined] - number of migration rounds to proceed. Basically this
parameter is one of the end conditions.
• MinDiv - [userdefined;userdefined] - minimal diversity. It is second end condition pa-
rameter. This parameter specifies how big is difference between best and worst individual
solution. If difference is smaller than this parameter, the algorithm will be ended. If we
specified MinDiv as value lesser or equal to zero this condition will never occur and thus
algorithm will end when all migrations end.
Process of mutation of this algorithm is similar to the other evolutionary algorithms with
the exception that mutation is renamed to perturbation (again due to algorithm philosophy,
functionality is the same). As we can see in pseudo-code (Listing 2).
for i:= 1 to N do
begin
if rnd_j < PRT then
PRTVector_j = 1
else
PRTVector_j = 0
end
Listing 2: SOMA perturbation vector pseudocode
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Crossover is performed unlike the others algorithms, where it is performed by the crossover
of 2 parents, by choosing the best offspring from steps taken by an active individual by its way
to the leader. With this philosophy of crossover, we can define the equation of directional vector
(Equation 5).
r⃗ = r⃗0 + m⃗ t ⃗PRTV ector , t ∈ [0, Step, PathLength] (5)
3.1.2.2 Algorithm
Following pseudo-code (Listing 3) is describing the basic version of SOMA - All to one.
{
Input:
x: first random generated population
f_cost: cost function returning fitness of actual solution
}
for i < Migrations do
begin
{choose best individual - Leader}
for j =< PopSize do
begin
{take j individual}
{get fitness of new position}
{choose best fitness individual and put it in new population}
end
if MinDiv < absolute_value(best_individual - worst_individual) then
begin
Exit()
end
end
Listing 3: SOMA All to one pseudocode
3.1.2.3 SOMA disadvantages
Amongst the biggest disadvantages belongs fact, that SOMA has too many adjustable parame-
ters. There were even attempts to use evolutionary algorithms to tune SOMA parameters.
3.1.2.4 Other versions of SOMA
Except for basic version "All to one" where all individuals heading to leader. There are few
other versions:
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• All to All - In this version of SOMA doesn’t exist Leader. All individuals are heading
gradually to all others. Migrations ends after last individual end its migration. After
that all individuals take new best positions which they found. This version is taking
more resources, but have better chance to find global extreme due to greater sampling of
hyper-surface.
• All to All Adaptive - This version is similar with version All to All, but the difference
is that individual take new best position immediately after its migration ends - not after
all individuals migration ends.
• All to One Rand - In this version all individuals heading to Leader, but Leader isn’t the
best individual on hyper-surface, but it is randomly chosen for each individual separately.
• Clusters - This version is applicable on all previous versions. It is basically only dis-
tribution individuals to sub-populations. In each sub-population is running independent
SOMA. With regard to individuals are moving it regarding to clusters can disintegrate to
more clusters and unite with other clusters.
3.1.3 Differential Evolution
Differential evolution is a type of algorithm founded in 1995 by K. Price and R. Storm. It has
similar schema as genetic algorithms, but instead of taking two parents for creating offspring it
takes four parents. In DE is performed mutation first and then is performed crossover, this is
different from others evolutionary algorithms.
3.1.3.1 Principle
Population in DE is similar to the other evolutionary algorithms where the first population is
generated randomly inside of specified boundary based on the given specimen.
In DE mutation using four parents instead of two. For every individual are randomly chosen
three other individuals (not same as the first one). Using this three individuals (r1, r2, r3) is
created noisy vector (v), which is combination of mutation these 3 individuals. We can define
noisy vector by Equation 6:
vj = xGr3,j + F (xGr1,j − xGr2,j) (6)
Where F is mutation constant and G is number of generation.
Crossover in DE is using 4. parent (r4) and noisy vector (v) to create new individual (trial).
This trial individual is created using crossover threshold (CR) so that there are taken parameters
in r4 and noisy vector (the same ones) in cycle and for each pair of parameters is generated
random number. When this random number is lesser than CR then trial relevant parameter is
set to value from noisy vector and vice versa. The condition for CR can be swapped without
impact to performance. This new created individual is compared with r4 and better one is taken
to new population.
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The whole principle of DE we can summarize to the following steps:
• Parameter settings - set parameters necessary for DE run
• Population - making starting population (usually randomly generated inside boundaries
and inspired by specimen)
• Generation cycle - in each generation is cyclically taken every individual in the popula-
tion, and it is performed evolution on it
• Actual evolution cycle - on each individual in previous step is performed evolution
(explained earlier)
• End condition test - in basic DE there is only one end condition, and it is number of
iteration, so basically, its only test if all generations were done
• Evaluation - if we want to show process of DE we can take every best individual in the
generation and then show it in the graph
These steps 3-5 or 3-6 (if the process of DE is needed to be shown), are repeated until all
generations are executed.
3.1.3.2 Algorithm
Following pseudo-code (Listing 4) is describing basic version of DE Rand1Bin.
{
Input:
x: first random generated population
f_cost: cost function returning fitness of actual solution
}
for i < Generations do
begin
for j =< NP do
begin
{take j individual}
{randomly take 3 individuals from population (not same as j)}
{do mutation}
{do crossover}
{get fitness of trial}
{compare trial with r4 and put better one to new population}
end
{replace old population by new one}
31
end
Listing 4: DE Rand1Bin
3.1.3.3 Adjustable parameters
In DE there are few parameters on which matters process of evolution. These parameters are:
• CR - [0, 1] - Crossover threshold. In case that CR is set to 0 mutation is not performed
and trial individual is created by copy of r4 parent. Otherwise if CR is set to 1 trial
individual is created only by first three parents (r1, r2, r3) and DE will perform more like
random search than evolutionary algorithm. Recommended value 0.8− 0.9. If is problem
separable CR << 1, otherwise CR ≈ 1.
• D - Problem dimension - number of arguments in cost function.
• NP - [10D, 100D] - Size of the population. If it is set lesser than 4 DE will not work.
Recommended value is 10D.
• F - [0, 2] - Mutation constant. Recommended value 0.3− 0.9.
• Generations - Number of generations in DE.
3.1.3.4 DE disadvantages
One of the primary disadvantages of DE is stagnation. Stagnation is in evolutionary algorithms
known as premature convergence. Premature convergence occurs when:
• population is in local extreme
• population lost diversity
• optimization process occurs slowly or not at all
However in some cases of DE, there is stagnation even if all these previous conditions are
negative.
3.1.3.5 Other versions of DE
There are several other versions of DE. We will show how is computed the noisy vector in some
of them. Noisy vector in these variants are computed the same in bin and exp version, but there
is difference how to fill trial in these versions.
• DE/best/1/exp, DE/best/1/bin (Equation ??)
v = xGbest,j + F · (xGr2,j − xGr3,j) (7)
32
• DE/rand/1/exp, DE/rand/1/bin (Equation 8)
v = xGr1,j + F · (xGr2,j − xGr3,j) (8)
• DE/rand-to-best/1/exp, DE/rand-to-best/1/bin (Equation 9)
v = xGi,j + λ · (xGbest,j − xGi,j) + F · (xGr1,j − xGr2,j) (9)
• DE/best/2/exp, DE/best/2/bin (Equation 10)
v = xGbest,j + F · (xGr1,j + xGr2,j − xGr3,j − xGr4,j) (10)
• DE/rand/2/exp, DE/rand/2/bin (Equation 11)
v = xGr5,j + F · (xGr1,j + xGr2,j − xGr3,j − xGr4,j) (11)
3.1.4 Genetic Algorithm
Genetic algorithms belongs between most famous evolutionary techniques. Genetic algorithms
were introduced by J. Holland. GA is based on evolutionary principle used in nature and
described by Ch. Darwin and J. G. Mendel. In classic GA we work with binary representation
of individual parameters.
3.1.4.1 Principle
The first population is generated randomly inside specified boundaries. In basic binary repre-
sentation, it is practically generating 0 or 1 to specified parameters of the individual.
Next is parent selection. This step is on of the key steps of GA. There are 2 basic methods
how to select parents. First method is "unit line" (Figure 3) selection where line of size 1 is
divided to as many parts as parents where the size of individual parts is dependent on how good
is specified individual. This value is obtained by cost functions and then converted to fitness
(normalization). Next is generated random number ∈ [0, 1]. Part which contains this random
generated number is selected as parent. The same process is repeated for second parent, but it
is needed to not to choose same parent twice. In this method is preserved fitness of individuals
since each of them has part size equal to its fitness on unit line.
Next method for parents selection is "rank selection". If its not done normalization to interval
[0, 1] unit line cannot be used as a parents selection method. In this case, are parents sorted by
value from cost function from smallest to largest and parent with the smallest cost value will
get number 1 another one will get number 2 and so on. In this method is not preserved fitness
of individuals since each individual has the same probability to be taken as a parent.
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Figure 3: Unit line with parents and its probabilities
As enhancement to these two methods was also introduced "Elitism". Elitism works by
choosing best individual in each population and this individual is automatically taken to next
population. This step improves process of GA in way that we do not loose best solutions and
thus improves performance of GA.
After parents are selected, the next step is crossover. In GA there are three versions of
crossover:
• Single-point
• Two-point
• Multi-point
Principle of crossover is the same for all of these versions, but the difference is how many genomes
are swapped. On the Figure 4 is showed multi-point crossover. The places where is performed
crossover are choosable.
Figure 4: Multi-point crossover GA
After crossover is one final step for individual and it is a mutation. Mutation in GA means
inversions of random bits (in binary represented individual). There are also three versions as
in crossover: one point, two point and multi point and it means here how many attributes/bits
will be inverted.
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3.1.4.2 Algorithm
Following pseudo-code (Listing 5) is describing basic version of GA.
{
Input:
x: first random generated population
f_cost: cost function returning fitness of actual solution
populationSize: size of population
}
for i < Generations do
begin
while actualNewPopulationSize < populationSize do
begin
{make unit line from fitnesses}
{choose parent_1 individual}
{choose parent_2 individual}
{do crossover}
{do mutation}
{get fitness of offsprings}
{put better one to new population}
end
{replace old population by new one}
end
Listing 5: Genetic algorithm
3.1.4.3 Adjustable parameters
In GA there are 4 main adjustable parameters:
• Number of generations
• Size of population
• Crossover probability - If crossover probability is 0 %, then all offspring are exact copy
of one of its parents. If crossover probability is 100 %, then all offspring are created as
crossover of both parents. Recommended value is 80-95 %.
• Mutation probability - If mutation probability is 0 %, then the offspring is unchanged.
If mutation probability 100 % all attributes/bits are inverted. Mutation was introduced
as prevention of stagnation. Recommended value is 0.5-1 %.
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3.1.4.4 GA disadvantages
As disadvantages of GA can be accounted the actual problem formulation so GA can solve it.
Next disadvantage is parameter adjustment even if there are not many parameters, it may be
hard to set right number of generations or population size or the others parameters.
3.1.4.5 Other versions of GA
There are several other version of basic GA, in the following lines is simple description of few of
them:
• Hybrid GA - This approach is based on searching in space by GA then in local areas are
executed local optimization techniques. It can be done by several approaches:
– GA is running until there are only minor changes and then is executed local opti-
mization technique assuming that algorithm is near global extreme.
– It is used GA starting population with several local extremes which are founded by
random starting individuals.
– Every x iteration is local optimization technique put its best solution/s as genome/s
to population.
• Messy GA - This type of GA is designed for faster convergence. In this type of GA
every chromosome can be different size and genomes have its own independent position.
So every attribute/bit has its value and position. There are two types of chromosomes:
– Chromosome that have on specific position more values. In this case is there rule of
the first - first chosen bit is used.
– Chromosome is lacking some of the attributes/bits. In this case is used bit from the
template. Template is individual with the best solution that was founded yet.
3.1.5 Cost function
In every evolutionary algorithm that was presented before was mention about cost function. In
this section, it will be explained what the cost function is.
The cost function can be basically described as function which is formulated by optimization
problem. As input have this function parameters for optimization and output is how good
solution with given parameters is. In case of optimization it is maximization or minimization of
output value.
The cost function can be also illustrated geometrically. Optimization is looking for maximum
or minimum on given N+1 dimension surface. Where there are N parameters/dimensions for
optimization as input and 1 dimension is for output value from cost function.
If is the algorithm for optimization written only for minimization or maximization and it is
needed to optimization in the other way there is easy solution witch rest in the modification
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of the cost function to return computed value multiplied by -1. This modification will inverse
extremes and required optimization can be processed with the same algorithm without changes
in it.
As an example for optimization it is showed Ackley’s function on Figures: 5, 6, 7. Parameters
for optimization are coordinates X and Y and as output it is coordinate Z. In real situations
they aren’t known the best parameters values as it is here where it can be seen from images that
best parameters values are X = 0 and Y = 0 for minimization.
Figure 5: Ackley’s function 1
Figure 6: Ackley’s function 2
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Figure 7: Ackley’s function 3
3.2 Types of malware
In this section will be stated various types of malware and their brief description. Malware is
abbreviation of malicious software. Malware has a malicious intent. This intent can differ, but
in most cases its acts against user will.
3.2.1 Viruses
A computer virus is a code which is recursively spread its copy or slightly changed copy. Viruses
infect computer files or elements in OS. The primary purpose of the virus is to spread itself, but
it is accompanied by payload most of the time.
3.2.2 Worms
Computer worm is virus which is mainly spreading by networks. Unlike viruses, they don’t need
host to its function (whole network is their host). There are worms which need user interaction
for example worms that are spreading via emails and worms which doesn’t need user interaction
for example worms that using some exploit to spread itself. Malware can be combined so it
can be easily seen malware that acts like worm to spread itself, but as secondary method it can
infect files on file system to spread, too.
3.2.2.1 Octopus worm
It is a special type of worm, where the actual worm is divided into parts. Every part is on
another location, and together they are performing action as a worm.
3.2.2.2 Rabbit
This type of computer worm is specific by its existence only in one copy in one moment and
jumping on network connected computers.
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3.2.3 Logic bombs
Logic bomb is type of bug in software, it can be intended or non-intended. It works on success
of condition - when this condition is evaluated as true, software performs specific bug - in case
of malware it will be probably some malicious code. This method can be even used as defense
mechanic of some viruses. Code of logic bomb is mostly hidden in source codes of given software
and in this way it can be propagated to next version of software too.
3.2.4 Trojan horses
Trojan horse is a type of malware which trying to pretend to be useful. It tries to take user
attention. Trojan horses are often included in software cracks 1. In another variant trojan horse
can contain some new feature included to original exists software, but besides that feature, it
contains malicious code too. This new feature can be included in software in two ways: First
way rests in available source code for attacker (for example open source projects) and second
way rests in repacking software (where is original software packed in new created software with
added functionality) or directly modifying software files. Trojan horses are often used to make
backdoor in user system or to make some spy activities such as collecting passwords or other
sensitive information.
3.2.4.1 Backdoor
Trojan horses are often used to make backdoor on targeted system. These backdoors can be
subsequently used to get remote access to infected system. These methods are often based on
opening network ports and their subsequent service (for example to access command line). This
way is quite good watched by firewalls, but malicious code in trojan horse can try to disable
firewall or hide this function to firewall. There is also the possibility to reverse this approach
and try connect from infected system to attacker system where attacker listening on specific
port - in this way it is much harder for firewall to recognize that it is malicious communication.
Another backdoor can for example use email hidden communication with attacker.
3.2.4.2 Sensitive information gathering
Trojan horses are also often used to gather sensitive information. These versions of trojan
horses are combined with keyloggers 2 or other spyware which can gather sensitive information,
for example, passwords or credit cards number etc.
1crack - a method which cracks (break) the software in a way that it can be used illegal (e. g. without serial
code)
2keylogger - computer software which gathers user pressed keys
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3.2.5 First virus generation
First virus generation is kind of "embryo" of computer virus. These first generations are often
without hosts files and do not contain some specific features such as the mark of already inflicted
file.
3.2.6 Exploits
Exploits are parts of malicious code which is aiming to exploit a specific vulnerability. The
purpose of exploit is to run some malicious code or to get access to the target system.
3.2.7 Downloaders
This type of malware has one main purpose - download malicious code. After downloading it,
it may be combined with some other exploits to run this malicious code.
3.2.8 Droppers
These are installers of the first virus generation. For example, boot viruses used droppers to get
to the boot sector.
3.2.9 Injectors
The injector is a type of malware which injects malicious code. Malicious code can be injected
to computer memory or also to network. For example, injector can modify driver for I/O disk
operations and then with every operation which is using writing to disk is executed malicious
code (e.g. appending virus to file). Network injectors can inject own packets to communication
(e.g. inject invalid packet and cause failure).
3.2.10 Auto-Rooters
These are mostly scripts or programs which are used to get administrator rights on targeted
systems using a set of exploits.
3.2.11 Virus generation tools
On the internet are available multiple tools to create your own virus without wider knowledge
about virus creation. These generators can produce viruses based on given requests. The success
of these generators is not 100 % so it can create many non-functional viruses too.
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3.2.12 Spam software
This kind of malware is primarily used to generate spam. Spam can be generated not only
through the email but also on another communication canals such as various types of messengers
etc.
3.2.13 Flooders
These types of malware are usually used to attack network elements. There are many types of
flooding methods such as the attack on 3-way handshake on TCP or others. The main purpose
of flooder is usually to perform a DoS attack.
3.2.14 Keyloggers
This type of malware is used to gather user pressed keys. This is sensitive information due
to chance that we type credentials or other sensitive data (such as credit card numbers) on
keyboard. Keyloggers are often combined with other functions such as exploits to make possible
send stored data to the attacker.
3.2.15 Rootkits
These are sets of exploits and scripts used by hackers to infect targeted system after gaining
administrator access to this system. These are usually modified files and programs which con-
tains another functions and backdoors which can be used lately. We can divide these modified
programs (or its parts) to two categories:
• User-mode rootkits - these running in user mode and have limited impact on user system
(that does not mean that they are not malicious), but they are easier to get to targeted
system
• Kernel-mode rootkits - these are running in kernel mode and have much more possibilities
to influence targeted systems - for example these can hide processes (useful when hiding
from antivirus) or files, change system registry and much more. But these are more difficult
to get on targeted system.
3.3 Virus defense techniques
Over time the authors of viruses founded that if they want to make their work last for a longer
time it’s needed to defend virus itself against general anti-virus solutions.
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3.3.1 Tunneling viruses
Tunneling viruses are viruses which trying to bypass defense systems based on behavior block-
ing3. The way how these viruses are trying bypass defense systems rests in calling directly
interrupts so defense monitoring systems does not see these steps.
3.3.1.1 Tracing with debugging
It is a method based on tracing interrupts to its origin. It is using debugging to hang up on
interrupts. In this way, whenever is targeted instruction executed is also called debug which
leads to trace interrupt address so viruses can access this address directly without calling system
API.
3.3.1.2 Code emulation
In this method is virus using code emulator to get entry point address. Code emulator will
ensure simulating CPU executing.
3.3.1.3 Communicating with HW
In this technique is virus communicating directly with HW (e.g. HDD) so it’s bypassing system
API and interrupts. This techniques allows the lowest possible level so there is opportunity to
write (in case of HDD) things which will not be allowed by API. But there is big disadvantage
too - this technique needs to know how to communicate with specific piece of HW.
3.3.1.4 Using undocumented API
Using undocumented API is a technique which easily bypasses behaviour blockers if it is using
APIs which are not known by these blockers. The reason is obvious, if behaviour blocker doesn’t
know undocumented API function then it doesn’t know what to do with it. In this case, can be
acquired entry point addresses (and other things too) by these undocumented APIs functions
or by combination and tricks with them.
3.3.2 Armored viruses
Armored viruses are viruses whose main purpose is to try as much as possible to hide from or
confuse scanners and make harder their analysis for humans and possibly make it impossible for
heuristic. In that case, is extended time needed to analyze and so is respond delayed.
3.3.2.1 Defense against disassembling
One of the basic defense mechanism against disassembling is to encode virus data. In this case,
it is needed to decode data first and after that can be performed analysis, which means finding
decryptor mechanism. However, virus decryptor has to be in decoded state (at least first one in
3defense against viruses based on typical virus behavior patterns (e.g. open executable file for writing, modify
it, save it)
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case of multiple encoding), so virus data can be decoded by the virus itself. Basic encoding can
be performed by simple XOR operation with some byte.
Another technique rests in confusing code by writing code ugly and sometimes ineffective
(purposefully) - for example when virus want to allocate 100 bytes it can instead of directly
allocating 100 bytes do some mathematics operations to calculate 100 bytes than it can copy it
somewhere else and copy it back do some loops (very high loop iterations is one of the possible
defense method against emulation) and other things which may or may not had nothing to do
with actual functionality of virus. This leads to very confusing code which is hard to analyze
and thus increasing response time.
Viruses often need some string in code to do their work - for example, email to send sensitive
data or names of APIs function to call. These string can be easily readable, and there are
many utilities which automatically can extract strings. Because this is not desirable behavior
(scanners and heuristic can detect these strings) viruses can use checksums of these strings. For
example instead of having a string with open file function name virus can have this string saved
as a checksum of this name and use API function which checksum is equal to saved one.
Another technique is compressing the code, and it has one obvious advantage - the virus is
after compression smaller. But in addition, the virus has to be decompressed to be readable
and can be performed disassembling and analysis. There are many packers which can pack
executable files, and they will ensure that when is program launched it is unpacked too.
3.3.2.2 Defense against debugging
Computer viruses are frequently debugged by anti-virus researchers, and thus computer viruses
are using defense techniques against debugging too.
Hanging up on debug interruptions is basic method used to prevent debugging. In case
that program is not debugged it is harmless, but in case of debugging these interruptions are
used by debugger and thus is executed code (it can be even calling another interruption so this
interruption will be masked) which is hanged up on these interruptions. Viruses can even use
these interruptions for decryptor and again if program isn’t debugged decryptor will be executed
normally when calling this interruptions, but in case that program is debugged debugger will
be using these interruptions (breakpoint for example) even on places that was not intended for
virus (e.g. executing decryptor) and thus virus will not work.
Another technique for defense against debugging use checksums to control integrity of itself.
If is program debugged there are inserted breakpoints to code and thus integrity check will
fail. These technique can be enhanced to error-correcting code so it will effectively remove
breakpoints.
If the virus is monitoring stack when the program is launched it is possible for the virus
to detect debugger. The debugger is using the stack to store tracing records, and thus virus
monitoring stack can find the debuggers records and recognize debugger.
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Another methods for detecting debuggers are quite simple. Viruses can find that there is
installed debugger on OS by searching in OS registry or alternatively virus can scan memory
for signs of running debugger etc.
Interesting method to block debugger after it is detected is to block keyboard so user cannot
use keyboard shortcuts to tracing. Another interesting method was used by virus "Cryptor"
which used keyboard buffer for storing cipher keys and thus when was virus debugged and user
was using keyboard to shortcuts (e.g. next step) cipher keys were rewritten.
Using exception handling method as a defense against debugging is a method which is based
on the fact that debuggers may not have implemented all exceptions and so debugger will forward
exception handling to OS.
3.3.2.3 Defense against heuristic analysis
There are two types of heuristic - static and dynamic. Static heuristic analysis is analysing file
format, and fragmentation in code such example can be appending virus. In case of appending
virus, it is placed jump somewhere near the start of the executable file. This jump pointing
somewhere near the end of the file, and so this behavior can be marked as suspicious by static
heuristic. Dynamic heuristic analysis is working with simulation and detection of suspicious
activities which occur on-the-fly. There are several ways how viruses are trying to confuse
heuristic analysis.
One of the methods which used as a defense against heuristic, is connecting to more than
1 section in PE file. In this case, is virus spread amongst the whole file, and it is harder for
heuristic scanner to find that the file is infected by the virus.
Another anti-heuristic technique is to encode original file header so heuristic will be confused
by this file.
Next anti-heuristic method is based on overwriting blank part of the first section with the
jump to start of the virus which can be located anywhere else.
Another anti-heuristic technique is based on shifting sections in PE. The whole virus is placed
in the code section, but most viruses aren’t so small that they can fit the whole virus in this
(there is need to be enough space there) section so virus will place itself to code section and
shift all others sections so for static heuristic it looks like ordinary file.
Next method is based on the packing code section and then appending to this section. In
this case, virus doesn’t need to shift other sections to fit there. After virus activation virus
unpack code section so the origin code section can be executed fine.
Another technique is technique using entry point obstruction. In this case virus do not
get control directly by overwriting entry point to itself, but virus is trying to overwrite/add
instruction to jump to yourself somewhere in file.
A similar technique to the previous one is technique when the entry point of virus is selected
randomly in code section. In this technique virus overwrite jump or call instruction somewhere
near original file entry point so virus take control after this instruction is executed.
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Next technique is using compiler alignment. The virus will divide itself into parts and fit
itself to these alignment areas).
Another anti-heuristic technique is a technique where virus does not mark any section as
writable and execute itself on the stack.
Next technique which viruses are using to confuse heuristic scanners is a method where the
virus is trying to found a collision in checksum algorithms, so it can have the same checksum
after infecting.
Another anti-heuristic method is to restrict infection of header because infection of the header
is often suspicious for heuristic.
Limitation of CALL-POP instructions. These instructions are used by viruses to detect
memory address location where is the virus itself located. This technique is quite simple and
effective, but for heuristic scanners, it isn’t a big problem to evaluate this behavior as suspicious.
As already mentioned in defense against disassembling, method using checksums of APIs
functions name is used as defense against heuristic too. So heuristic scanners cannot easily
distinguish these strings.
3.3.2.4 Defense against emulation
Emulation is used for exploration of how the virus works on-the-fly. In next paragraphs will be
described some of the techniques used by viruses for defense against it.
Using instructions that are not implemented in emulator. In the past emulators didn’t have
implemented instructions for FPU and MMX (multimedia instructions), so viruses used them
in its code. These instructions then cannot be emulated. Nowadays anti-viruses have emulators
with these instructions implemented.
Another method using by the viruses to disable emulators is using SEH. In this case, viruses
try to raise an exception which handling is not implemented in the emulator. So emulator may
not get to the virus code if the exception is raised sooner.
Next method is using "randomly" executing virus code. What it means is that virus code is
not executed whenever is host file launched. So virus hosts file can be emulated when the virus
will not be executed at all.
Another method is based on using undocumented processor instructions - it is the similar
case as when older emulators didn’t have implemented FPU and MMX. When emulator doesn’t
know these instructions, it can’t emulate them.
Next method is using brute force to decode itself. In this case virus doesn’t contain key to
decode its body and instead of key it use brute force to decode. For emulators it uses many
iterations for decoding and thus with combination of emulator is not as fast as running program
directly it can take too much time to accomplish it (users don’t want to wait too much).
Another method which is used as a defense against emulations is a method based on multi-
threading. In this case, viruses are trying to use multi-threading and hope that emulator will
not have multi threading or APIs associated with it implemented.
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Using long loops is a similar anti-emulation method as method described above which uses
brute force to decode itself. But in this case, it does not have to be decoding which causes a
long loop, but anything else. It may be a thing which is needed for running the virus, but it
may be not - for example, some calculations which are meaningless in term of successful virus
execution.
3.3.3 Retroviruses
Retroviruses are trying to evade or to disable anti-viruses, firewall or other security systems.
Retroviruses can be used for disabling security systems and making a path for viruses which
will be normally detected by these safety systems.
In the following list are stated some of the techniques used by retroviruses:
• Disabling and/or removing security systems from memory or file system. (anti-viruses,
firewalls etc.)
• Removing or modifying files which are used for integrity check.
• Attack anti-virus so anti-virus itself can do malicious activity - for example removing other
security systems.
• Try to escape while virus is scanned (e.g. attack the scanner and/or infect another files
with scanner)
• Preventing to download virus databases for anti-viruses or updates (the same applies to
other security systems or even for OS security updates).
3.4 Experiments
Not many experiments were done with the use of evolutionary malware. Following lines will
describe 2 of them.
3.4.1 Evolvable malware
Experiment[2] done by S. Nooren, S. Murtaza, M. Z. Shafiq and M. Farooq is following up
creating new viruses using the genetic algorithm and known virus family called Bagle. Authors
made a simple framework which consists of 3 modules:
• Code analyzer - it ensures generating high-level genotype of the virus from machine code
• Genetic algorithm
• Code generator - it ensures code generation from newly created genotype
The Figure 8 describe architecture of evolution malware framework.
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Figure 8: Evolution malware framework
Source: [2]
3.4.1.1 Bagle
Bagle is a mass-mailing worm. There are several versions of Bagle. Some versions of Bagle
contains its own SMTP engine. Bagle also contains backdoors. For example, it can be opening
TCP ports and listening on them and copying itself to System directory.
3.4.1.2 Abstract representation
The Table 1 shows Bagle abstract representation with all features, its description and exam-
ple values. From the abstract representation authors created "gene library" which contains all
possible feature values for all features. These features are then used to form individual for GA.
3.4.1.3 Experimental setup
In the experimental setup (Figure 9), authors work with 15 unique variants of Bagle from various
sources.
At first were Bagle samples divided to training and testing categories. Fitness function was
formed as similarity of chromosomes against chromosomes in training category then is fitness
normalized by assigning weight to each gene of representation. Offsprings for next generation
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Table 1: Abstract representation of Bagle
Feature Description Examples
Date The date checked by Bagle to (de-)activate its process 28 January, 2004
Application The applications used to conceal Bagle calc.exe, notepad.exe, sndrec32.exe
Port Number Port opened by Bagle to send or receive commands 2475, 6777, 2556
Attachment Name of the attachment used by Bagle Random characters
Attachment Extension It specifies the extension of the attachment .rar, .exe, .pif, .zip
Websites Bagle contact the websites to inform about the infection http://www.it-msc.de/1.php, http://www.getyourfree.net/1.php
Domain Bagle ignores to email itself to the domains specified @hotmail.com, @msn.com
Email Body Contains the email body of Bagle Test=), YoursID <Random Characters>
Email Subject Specifies the subject of the email Hi, Subject:ID <Random Characters>
Registry Variable Contains the name of registry variables used by Bagle au.exe, d3dupdate.exe
Virus Name Name of the Bagle shown in the task manager bbeagle.exe, au.exe, readme.exe
File Extension File extensions to be searched in the fixed directories .wab, .txt, .htm, .php
Process Terminated Processes terminated by Bagle atupdater.exe, aupdate.exe
P2P Propagation Names used by Bagle to copy itself to peer computers ACDSee 9.exe, Ahead Nero 7.exe
Source: [2]
Figure 9: Experimental setup
Source: [2]
are selected based on their fitness. Thus exact match of evolved Bagle individual is equal to
fitness = 1. There can happen 3 conclusions when individual is generated and its fitness ̸= 1.
These conclusions are:
• Individual is from test category
• Individual is new Bagle virus
• Individual is not a Bagle virus
Genetic algorithms parameters are seen in Table 2. For selection were used multiple methods:
roulette wheel, rank, tournament. Crossover methods used in GA were one-point, two-point and
uniform.
Table 2: Parameters configuration of GA - Bagle experiment
Crossover probability 0.75
Mutation probability 0.005
Population size 500
Source: [2]
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3.4.1.4 Results
Authors show results based on how close was generated individuals fitness to fitness of specific
Bagle types and show which type of crossover and selection was used to achieve the best fitness.
Next author tested sample evolved malware by commercial antivirus software AVG and Syman-
tec. Detection rates are shown in Table 3. The interesting thing is that Symantec antivirus has
identified in 14.64 % cases from 41.1 % (total detected) virus as "W32.Sality.AE" which was not
included nor in training neither in the testing set.
Table 3: Detection rates of evolved malware
AVG [%] Symantec [%]
Detected 98.98 41.1
Undetected 1.02 58.9
Source: [2]
This means that it is possible to evolve new malware from other samples as authors stated:
"These results prove our claim that the proof-of-concept malware evolution engine has successfully
evolved unseen malware."
3.4.2 Towards Automated Malware Creation
In the experiment done by A. Cani, M. Gaudesi, E. Sanchez, G. Squillero and A. Tonda were used
an evolutionary algorithm (µGP - http://ugp3.sourceforge.net/) to determine the optimal
position for hiding malicious code inside an existing executable and to code generation.
3.4.2.1 Code generation
For code generation authors used already mentioned EA - µGP and inserted to initial popula-
tion code of the virus "Timid". Timid is simple file infector virus which whenever is executed
infected ".COM" file it copies its code to other uninfected ".COM" file within the same directory.
Framework schema is shown in Figure 10.
Authors used assembly compiler and DOS scripts which kills individuals process if they run
more than 5 seconds (to ensure killing infinite loops).
Authors then choose four freeware antiviruses which all of them has to have heuristic only
detection which is configurable and fast scanning. Database driven detection is excluded due to
newly generated malware will not be in the database, and it is time-consuming procedure.
Next authors used 5 ".COM" files from the "system32" folder and check them with md5
function to get their hash, so integrity check can be done subsequently.
The initial population of each run of the framework contains only one individual who repre-
sents the original code of Timid. Parameters are set µ = 10, λ = 8 for each framework run.
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Figure 10: Framework schema for code generation
Source: [3]
3.4.2.2 Code generation results
Max fitness value was reached 96 times of 100 which means that 96 newly created malware are
behaving like the original one, are compiled without errors and executed successfully. All four
free antiviruses don’t detect this newly generated malware by its heuristic. Framework runs are
in an average terminated in the 6th generation, and the standard deviation is 2.5.
3.4.2.3 Code integration
Authors selected two executable files to perform code injection. First one is the program which
is used to split files to smaller parts and also join them to origin file. Its executable is named
SPLIT.EXE with size 46.5 kB (http://www.iacosoft.com/home/split.txt). The second one
is data recovery software TESTDISK.EXE with size 315.2 kB (http://www.cgsecurity.org/
wiki/TestDisk). Framework schema for code injection is shown in Figure 11.
Authors define two types of zones where to inject code:
• Type I - zones are almost always skipped during regular execution
• Type II - zones that are usually not processed in normal flow and often appear after the
end of the main function
According to authors, it is rationale to use Type I zones to overwriting with a call to call
malicious code and Type II zones to store actual malicious code.
An evolutionary algorithm is there used to compute parameters offset and size. Where offset
is the offset from the beginning of the compiled code in bytes and size is the size of the part in
bytes.
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Figure 11: Framework schema for code injection
Source: [3]
3.4.2.4 Code integration results
For executable SPLIT.EXE were parameters set to µ = 100, λ = 30, offset ∈ (0, 43000) and
size ∈ (12, 1000). Results are seen in Table 4.
Table 4: Code integration experiments - SPLIT.EXE results
SPLIT.EXE
Evaluations 300
Type I (zones found) 1
Type I (largest zone) 334
Type II (zones found) 32
Type II (largest zone) 1511
Source: [3]
For executable TESTDISK.EXE were parameters set to µ = 100, λ = 30 and size ∈ (12, 1000).
Results are seen in Table 5.
3.4.2.5 Conclusion
Authors showed how to improve malware to escape detection via an evolutionary algorithm in
the first experiment. In the second experiment authors showed how to improve searching for
weak points in application to perform code injection.
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Table 5: Code integration experiments - TESTDISK.EXE results
TESTDISK.EXE
Offset (0,43000) (0,10000) (0,2000)
Evaluations 15000 2000 300
Type I (zones found) - 1 1
Type I (largest zone) - 33 25
Type II (zones found) 3 4 3
Type II (largest zone) 179 167 183
Source: [3]
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4 Practical part
This section will be divided into three subsections. The first one is a description of written virus
and its modules including how these modules work. The second one is user manual on how to
setup the virus to use. The last one is detection testing of the virus.
4.1 Virus description
The virus itself is divided into three main parts:
• Main program - the part which caters for virus running
• Modules - this part contains modules that are used by the evolution process to create new
a virus
• Evolution - the part which caters for virus evolution via evolutionary algorithms and cost
functions
4.1.1 Main program
In this section is described work of virus execution in a nutshell. A more detailed description of
individual modules is in the modules section.
Main program consists of "virusSize" (Listing 6) variable with set value. This value is changed
after compilation to get exact size of compiled virus this is described more in modules section
in infection part.
int virusSize = 1234567890;
Listing 6: virusSize variable
Then there is a try block where takes place whole virus execution. Raised exceptions are
handled, and then logged to file ("virus-exceptions.txt") on active windows user desktop.
At first, there are initialized variables for pseudo-random number generation, an instance of
actual virus and an instance of the compiler.
After initialization is reconstructed original file (via infector module) that user means to
launch with parameters for launch forwarded.
After reconstructing phase starts virus execution. At first, there is a logical bomb which
conditions must be met or virus will not be executed.
If logical bomb condition is met then is starting the evolution of the new virus. It is chosen
fitness function and evolutionary algorithm with computed parameters which will be responsible
for virus evolution.
Evolved malware is then forwarded to compiler module which ensures its compilation and
loading it to the byte array.
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After compiling and loading virus to the byte array there are searched victims for new virus
by currently executing virus via "VictimSearcher" module.
After victims are founded, there is forwarded byte array of a new virus and number of victims
to infect parameter to "infector" module of the currently executed virus. Then the current virus
will start to infect its victims.
After infection of victims, there is part with logging data about the current virus, victims,
newly evolved virus etc. This part, of course, exists only due to the experimental nature of
this master thesis. The true virus will probably not have this section or will be gathering other
information that is more relevant for it.
Then is executed payload module of the currently executed virus.
4.1.2 Modules
Modules are divided to 5 categories:
• Compilers
• Infectors
• LogicBombs
• Payloads
• VictimSearchers
Each category consists of one or more modules that do their work that is specified by its
category. Each module in the category have to implement the interface of appropriate category,
e.g. modules in category Compilers have to implement "ICompile" interface. These modules are
then used by evolutionary algorithms to create new malware.
4.1.2.1 Compilers
The compiler module is responsible for compiling new virus individual from the given main
structure. Compilers modules has to implement ICompile interface (Listing 7).
public interface ICompile
{
byte[] Compile(string main);
}
Listing 7: ICompile interface
In this work was written only one compiler class ("Compiler.cs) and one helper compiler class
("HelperCompiler.cs").
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Helper compiler class caters about finding the path to "csc.exe" which is C# compiler pro-
vided by .NET Framework. This goal is achieved by looking for the correct key in the registry.
If the path to "csc.exe" is founded it is returned.
Compiler class (Compiler.cs) method "Compile" first gets the path to "csc.exe" from helper
class and if the path is founded it continues to the next step.
Again compiler work is contained in a try block to handle possible raised exceptions.
At first compiler tries to create temp directory in Windows temp folder. Name of this
directory is number from 10000 to 10000000. Compiler generates random number in this range
and if there is a directory with the same name it is generated a new random number. This
process continues until the directory is created.
After temp directory for the compiler is created. There is saved and extracted zip archive
("virus.zip") with the source code of modules, dynamic linked libraries which allows using com-
pression + PowerShell in virus and "files.txt" file which contains relative paths to all files that
are needed for compilation.
After that, compiled resources are extracted from currently running assembly. This extrac-
tion is performed by binary reading actual assembly and searching for saved byte array pattern.
This byte array pattern is saved in compiler class in reverse order, because otherwise there will
be always 2 matches of this pattern (1 desired result + 1 pattern result). When this pattern
is founded specified amount of bytes ("resourcesSize" variable)(Listing 8) is copied and saved
as "virus.Properties.Resources.resources" to temp directory. This *.resources file is compiled
resource file that contains zip archive "virus.zip". The "resourcesSize" integer variable has to
have value which is equal or a few bytes greater than size of compiled resources file to ensure
that resource file can be used in compilation of virus.
int resourcesSize = 52000; //a few bytes more to eliminate compression
fluctuation
Listing 8: resourcesSize variable
After all required files are extracted compiler creates file "Program.cs" with the structure
which was given to compiler as a parameter.
At this moment all files needed for compilation of new virus are prepared. Then is created
a string with all required parameters and with all relative paths to files to compile.
This string is then together with the path to "csc.exe" passed to "ProcessStartInfo", and this
process ("csc.exe") is started in a hidden window.
After compilation ends "virus.exe" is loaded to memory, compiler perform cleanup of temp
folder and loaded virus is returned.
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4.1.2.2 Infectors
Infectors are responsible for infection and reconstruction of the host. The interface that infectors
have to implement is shown in Listing 9.
public interface IInfector
{
int InfectorID { get; }
List<string> Infect(HashSet<string> filenames, byte[] virus, int
numberOfFilesToInfect);
void Reconstruct(int virusSize, string[] args);
}
Listing 9: IInfector interface
In this work was written prepend infector class ("PrependInfector.cs") and one helper infector
class ("HelperInfector.cs").
HelperInfector class caters about PreInfectRoutine, combining two bytes array and selecting
files for infection if there are more files to infect available than is requested.
PreInfectRoutine (Listing 10) is a method which gets as parameter virus in a byte array.
The method then performs requested changes on a virus byte array. These changes are creating
infection mark which is created by inserting by "0x6E" (’n’ in ASCII) to position 89. This is the
position where is in EXE files placed the text "This program cannot be run in DOS mode." or
other variations and changes this text to "This progran cannot be run in DOS mode.".
After placing infection mark, it is computed the length of virus byte array, and it is searched
bytes that locates the reloc section in PE file. Then is again searching for the pattern for the
integer value of "1234567890" which is the value of "virusSize" variable in the main function
in "Program.cs". These bytes are then replaced by bytes from integer variable that represents
actual virus length. Patterns are again saved in routine in reversed order to get exact match
results when searching in a virus byte array.
public static void PreInfectRoutine(byte[] virus)
{
virus[89] = 0x6E; //infection mark
byte[] relocPattern = new byte[] { 0x63, 0x6F, 0x6C, 0x65, 0x72, 0x2E }; //
reversed
byte[] sizePattern = new byte[] { 0x49, 0x96, 0x02, 0xD2 }; // reversed,
int 1234567890
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byte[] newSize = BitConverter.GetBytes(virus.Length);
int relocIndex = virus.FirstIndexOf(relocPattern.Reverse().ToArray());
int sizeIndex = virus.FirstIndexOf(sizePattern.Reverse().ToArray(),
relocIndex);
for (int i = sizeIndex; i < sizeIndex + 4; i++)
virus[i] = newSize[i % sizeIndex];
}
Listing 10: PreInfectRoutine method
In PrependInfector class there are two methods: Infect and Reconstruct and one property:
InfectorID.
The infect method ensures infecting files, it has parameters: filenames - full path to potential
victims, virus in a byte array, number of files to infect.
At first "Infect" method calls function from helper class to get exact HashSet of files to infect.
Then is executed "PreInfectRoutine" on a virus byte array. After that are all files infected by
prepend virus bytes to host file bytes. The old host file is deleted and replaced by infected host
file.
Reconstruct method ensures reconstructing and launching the original host file for the user
with forwarded arguments.
At first "Reconstruct" method get the location of which is currently launched assembly
launched. After that, it reads from this location itself and creates string arguments for the
launching application. Then it checks if the reconstructed file is already existing if so it is
launched with passed parameters. If not it is calculated victim size and it is created origin
host file with ’.’ character on the start of the name and with file attribute hidden set. Then is
launched this reconstructed host file with passed arguments.
4.1.2.3 LogicBombs
Logic bombs are responsible for virus triggering. When the condition of the logic bomb is met
the virus code will be executed. The interface that logic bombs have to implement is shown in
Listing 11.
public interface ILogicBomb
{
int LogicBombID { get; }
bool Execute(object o);
}
Listing 11: ILogicBomb interface
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Object "o" in the "Execute" method can be any object, some of the logic bombs working with
that object. In this work is that object used in Program.cs main method and it is string consisted
of ’a’ characters with random length in range 1 to 100.
There are 7 logic bombs implemented in this work:
• MagicianLogicBomb
• Magician2LogicBomb
• ObjLengthLogicBomb
• ObjLength2LogicBomb
• RandomLogicBomb
• Time1LogicBomb
• Time2LogicBomb
MagicianLogicBomb works on math trick with number 1089. This trick using a three-digit
number which digits are different from each other. From selected number is subtracted the
number that is created by reversing order of digit from origin number. Then is taken the
absolute value of this result as the new result. To this new result is added number that is again
created by reversing digit order and the result of this is 1089. There is 9× 9× 8 numbers that
will give this result. So it is 9×9×8900 = 0.72 => 72% chance of getting this result. In practical
testing on 1× 106 iterations were results 0.71± 0.01.
Magician2LogicBomb class works on another math trick. In this trick it is randomly selected
integer number from interval< 1; 6 > and then this number is multiplied in this order by numbers
9, 111, 1001 then the result is divided by 7. The result will contain digits 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8. In
this class is as input chosen random number from interval < 1; 9 > so the trigger probability is
6
9 =
2
3 ≈ 0.66 => 66%.
ObjLengthLogicBomb works on object.ToString() length, when length modulo 2 = 0 then
logic bomb triggers.
ObjLength2LogicBomb works on object.ToString() length, when length modulo 3 != 0 then
logic bomb triggers.
RandomLogicBomb works on generating random double in the interval < 0; 1.0) and when
the number is lesser than 0.65 it triggers.
Time1LogicBomb triggers in dependency on actual Unix time seconds. If this number modulo
2 != 0 logic bomb triggers.
Time1LogicBomb triggers in dependency on actual Unix time seconds. If this number modulo
3 != 0 logic bomb triggers.
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4.1.2.4 Payloads
Payloads are responsible for performing malicious activity. Every payload has to implement
interface shown in Listing 12.
public interface IPayload
{
int PayloadID { get; }
void Execute();
}
Listing 12: IPayload interface
There are five payloads in this work, but all payloads are just message boxes with the
following strings:
• "Cheers!"
• "Gimmie cookie!"
• "Good <morning/afternoon/evening>, <windows user name>."
• "I got you!"
• "You are infected! <actual datetime>"
4.1.2.5 VictimSearchers
VictimSearchers are responsible for looking for victims. Every VictimSearcher has to implement
interface shown in Listing 13.
public interface IVictimSearcher
{
int SearcherID { get; }
HashSet<string> GetFiles();
}
Listing 13: IVictimSearcher interface
There are 5 VictimSearchers and one helper class in this work.
Helper class is responsible for 3 main things:
• Getting file location from the given link (*.lnk) - for this purpose is used library that allows
using of PowerShell
• Recursive searching in directories with given depth and start path
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• Checking if the file can be infected - checking infection mark and file attributes
Among actual VictimSearchers belongs these five VictimSearchers:
• DesktopSearcher
• StartMenuSearcher
• TaskBarSearcher
• TreeSearcher
• UserAssistSearcher
All VictimSearchers logic is surrounded witch try block. Exceptions are then handled and
logged to "virus-exception.txt" file on user desktop.
DesktopSearcher is using "Environment" variable to get the path to actual user Desktop
folder then starts recursively searching for victims on Desktop and its sub-directories.
StartMenuSearcher is using "Environment" variable to get the path to actual user "application
data" folder and then is this path concatenated with the string "Microsoft\Windows\ Menu\"
result represents the path to current user Start Menu folder. Then StartMenuSearcher starts
recursively searching for victims there and in its sub-directories.
TaskBarSearcher is using "Environment" variable to get the path to actual user "applica-
tion data" folder and then is this path concatenated with the string "Microsoft\Internet Ex-
plorer\Quick Launch\User Pinned\TaskBar\" result represents the path to current user pinned
items on Task Bar. Then TaskBarSearcher starts searching for victims there.
TreeSearcher gets the actual launched assembly path and then combine it with ".." string
which means to get one directory upwards. From there searcher starts searching recursively for
victims including sub-directories.
UserAssistSearcher is using registry entries of windows where are stored launched applica-
tions. The registry path in which searcher looking is
"Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\UserAssist\" + one of the nodes listed
below + "\Count"
• "CEBFF5CD-ACE2-4F4F-9178-9926F41749EA"
• "F4E57C4B-2036-45F0-A9AB-443BCFE33D9F"
Entries there are encoded with rot13 encryption, so for getting the path to the application
it is needed to decrypt them. Also for getting full path there is need to assign GUIDs to correct
folder, because entries are saved in form of <rot13 encrypted GUID>+<encrypted rot13 relative
path>. So when searcher passing nodes it is needed to decrypt whole string entry and then
replace known GUID with correct folder. Correct known GUIDs for Windows 7 and newer are:
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• "1AC14E77-02E7-4E5D-B744-2EB1AE5198B7"
"C:\Windows\System32"
• "6D809377-6AF0-444B-8957-A3773F02200E"
"C:\Program Files"
• "7C5A40EF-A0FB-4BFC-874A-C0F2E0B9FA8E"
"C:\Program Files (x86)"
• "F38BF404-1D43-42F2-9305-67DE0B28FC23"
"C:\Windows"
• "0139D44E-6AFE-49F2-8690-3DAFCAE6FFB8"
"C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs"
• "9E3995AB-1F9C-4F13-B827-48B24B6C7174"
"<current user appdata>\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Quick Launch\User Pinned"
• "A77F5D77-2E2B-44C3-A6A2-ABA601054A51"
"<current user appdata>\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs"
• "D65231B0-B2F1-4857-A4CE-A8E7C6EA7D27"
"C:\Windows\SysWOW64"
After decryption of entries searcher can use CanInfect method from the helper and then
decide if the entry will be selected as a victim.
4.1.3 Evolution
Evolution prosecutes 3 main parts:
• Evolutionary algorithms - implementation of individual evolutionary algorithms
• Individuals - virus individuals which are used in cost function and evolutionary algorithms
• Fitness functions
4.1.3.1 Evolutionary algorithms
Evolutionary algorithms part consists of one helper class and four classes with implementation
of actual evolutionary algorithms.
All evolutionary algorithms has to implement interface shown in Listing 14.
interface IEvolution
{
Individual Execute();
}
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Listing 14: IEvolution interface
The helper class is responsible for generating random population, generating random indi-
vidual and for converting ranges - which is needed for some of the implemented algorithms.
Implemented algorithms are listed below. How algorithms work is showed in the theoretical
part of this master thesis. All these algorithms are solving minimization task.
• Differential evolution in version DE/rand/1/bin
• Genetic Algorithm
• Particle Swarm with inertia implementation
• Self Organized Migration Algorithm (SOMA) in version All to One
4.1.3.2 Individuals
Individuals part consists of helper class and Individual which inherits from RawIndividual.
The helper class is responsible for getting virus structure and list of all specified modules
(all infectors, all logic bombs etc.). Also in this class is "enum" with the structure of the virus.
The structure of the virus is shown in Table 6.
Table 6: RawIndividual virus structure in integer array
int[4] structure
0 1 2 3
LogicBombs VictimSearchers Infectors Payloads
ID Name ID Name ID Name ID Name
0 Magician2LogicBomb 0 DesktopSearcher 0 PrependInfector 0 CheersPayload
1 MagicianLogicBomb 1 StartMenuSearcher 1 CookiePayload
2 ObjLength2LogicBomb 2 TaskBarSearcher 2 GoodXYPayload
3 ObjLengthLogicBomb 3 TreeSearcher 3 IGotYouPayload
4 RandomLogicBomb 4 UserAssistSearcher 4 YRInfectedPayload
5 Time1LogicBomb
6 Time2LogicBomb
RawIndividual class contains several constructors for creating RawIndividual. Every RawIn-
dividual consists of LogicBomb, VictimSearcher, Infector, Payload. From input parameters are
filled all properties and it is created structure in the integer array format too. Another thing
which RawIndividual caters about is creating the main program file. This file is created in
dependency of which modules are used in instance of the individual.
Individual is class which inherits from RawIndividual, and it adds fitness property which is
in use by evolutionary algorithms and fitness function respectively.
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4.1.3.3 Fitness functions
The fitness functions are responsible for measuring how "good" is the given individual. All fitness
functions have to implement interface shown in Listing 15.
public interface IFitnessFunction
{
double GetFitness(RawIndividual individual);
}
Listing 15: IFitnessFunction interface
In this work is implemented one fitness function (called DistanceFitnessFunction) based on
distance or difference of actual individual from its ancestor. There is a distance matrix for each
module (infector, logic bomb, victim searcher, payload) that is used in RawIndividual. This
matrix contains distances of module individuals from each other. Metric for computing distance
between modules is based on the number of similar programming elements used in module and
can be viewed in "distanceMatrix.xlsx" attachment of this work.
Fitness is computed based on the distance of module individuals (current and ancestor)
from each other and added together for all modules. Then is fitness multiplied by -1, because
of algorithms are implemented for solving minimization.
4.2 User manual
Deployment of virus developed in this work is not so simple as deploying a classic application.
Deployment is performed in the following steps:
1. Creating virus.zip archive. This archive consists of folders Evolution, Extension, Modules
contained in visual studio solution in the sub-folder virus. These folders (Figure 12)
contains sub-folders and files with source code. Whenever is the source code of virus
changed it is needed to copy and overwrite these folders to "virus.zip" archive to ensure
that next iterations of the virus have updated code. Next files that are contained in the
"virus.zip" archive are:
• "Resources.Designer.cs" - file generated by Visual Studio that contains information
about resources. If a new resource is added to the solution, it is needed to overwrite
this file too. This file is located in Properties sub-folder of virus starting solution
folder.
• "Interop.IWshRuntimeLibrary.dll" - library that is allowing using PowerShell in virus
• "files.txt" - the file that contains relative path (from "files.txt" location) to all source
code files including "Resources.Designer.cs"
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File virus.zip is available as an attachment of this work too, but if there are made changes
in the code, it is needed to overwrite respective folders and files too.
Figure 12: Evolution, Extension, Modules folders
2. Placing virus.zip to solution resources (Figure 13).
Figure 13: Solution resources
3. Delete from obj folder (Realease/Debug - it depends on what type we are building) file
"virus.Properties.Resources.resources".
4. Build solution.
5. Check what size has newly created file "virus.Properties.Resources.resources" in obj folder.
If file size is greater then value of variable "resourcesSize" (Figure 14) in "Modules/Mod-
ules/Compilers/Compiler.cs" file then it is needed to adjust value of this variable to be a
few bytes greater than size of "virus.Properties.Resources.resources".
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Figure 14: resourcesSize variable
6. If Step 5 check is true then adjust "resourcesSize" variable and go to Step 1 else continue.
7. Now is virus in its first form done and it is needed to do first infection. This is performed
by "FirstVirusInfector" application that is available as attachment of this work.
8. Place "virus.exe" from virus solution to "FirstVirusInfector" application.
9. Place any executable application that will server as host to "FirstVirusInfector" application
and named it "victim.exe".
10. Launch "FirstVirusInfector" application.
11. Done. Infected host application will be named "infected-victim.exe". This application is
fully functional and it is infected by the virus. Be careful to not launch this application
in an uncontrolled environment.
Be aware that changes in "Program.cs" in virus solution will be available only for the first
virus iteration. If changes are needed in other iterations of virus, it is necessary to edit "Evolu-
tion/Individuals/RawIndividual.cs" "CreateMain()" method too.
4.3 Detection testing
Testing of detection was performed by two approaches. The first one was running tester appli-
cation on "Windows 10 Pro N" system with installed antivirus (free or trial) from one of the
following companies:
• Avast
• Eset
• Kaspersky
Only antivirus from Avast detected a threat. Detected threat is shown in Figure 15. Detected
threat name was "IDP.ALEXA.51", that is malware which uses Windows temporary folder to
save "EXE" files there. This is similar behavior to virus written in this master thesis because
this virus use Windows temporary folder for compilation of newly generated virus (until it cleans
up).
The second approach was upload host application infected by virus (PuTTY as host
application in this case) to virustotal.com. On virustotal detected this file 20 engines
out of 71. Report can be found on this address https://www.virustotal.com/#/file/
c018dd72515c6207e05036918903547be4ff084b123be09ee26c278e9c751655/detection and
its part is shown in Figure 16.
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Figure 15: Avast threat detection
Figure 16: Virustotal detection
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5 Experiment
Experiment section is divided to 3 parts - the testing environment, the course of the test and
the test results.
5.1 Testing environment
Testing OS was freshly installed "Windows 10 Pro N" into Oracle VM Virtualbox. Windows 10
was then updated to latest version 1809 with OS build 17763.379. Then was created following
hierarchy on file system with X replaced by the number of application (1, 2, 3 etc.):
• 30x Program - C:\Other Programs\Program-X\Program-X.exe
• 20x Game - C:\Games\Game-X\Game-X.exe
• 15x Work - C:\Work\Work-X\Work-X.exe
• 10x Downloads - C:\Users\User\Downloads\Download-X.exe
All these applications were launched twice in the same order as is listed above.
All applications listed above, except Download applications, have its shortcut on Desktop in
their respective folder (Programs, Games, Work).
Next were added following shortcuts to Taskbar (Windows bottom bar):
• Program-1, Program-2, Program-3
• Game-1
• Work-1, Work-2
and to Start menu following shortcuts:
• Program-4, Program-5
• Game-2, Game-3
• Work-3, Work-4, Work-5
As the last was application "tester" placed on Desktop. This application was created to
automate the testing process and it is available as an attachment of this work. This application
was also edited to contain infected mark so viruses will not try to infect it.
Then was created a snapshot of OS which is used as a starting point for every test.
67
5.2 Testing
Total 10 virus types were created for testing. One for every implemented evolution algorithm
(DE, GA, PSO, SOMA) and one that was every time randomly choosing one of the implemented
algorithm, with equal chances to be taken for all algorithms. In addition to this, all previous
variants were made in 2 versions. One which set the virus number of infection to 3 and the
second one set the virus number of infection to 5.
Application tester was created to help automate testing. This application has as input
parameters path to virus log file (virus.txt on desktop) and parameter depth. Parameter depth
is used for controlling depth of launching offspring of virus. The application then work in this
way:
1. Read all lines from virus.txt and save lines that are not in the processedLines list to the
unprocessedLines list.
Line is consisted of attributes of virus separated by ’>’ character. These attributes are (in
this order):
• "whoAmI" - attribute that contains path to virus that write this line
• "composition" - virus structure6 of this virus
• "whoMadeMe" - name of evolutionary algorithm which made this virus
• "ancComposition" - virus structure6 of ancestor of this virus
• "iInfect" - list of paths to files that this virus infected separated by ’|’ character
2. Launch every item from "iInfect" list (logic bomb of launched virus can prevent execution
of virus logic (not host application - that is launched always))
3. Save lines from the unprocessedLines list to the processedLines list.
4. Clear the unprocessedLines list.
5. Increment actual depth variable.
6. If the actual depth is lesser than depth from the input parameter go to step 1.
The following scenario was then running for every virus type 5 times:
1. Launch script that periodically kills instances of the PuTTY application (infected host
application) to avoid running tens of instances of it.
2. Place actually tested virus type (infected-victim.exe) to downloads folder
3. Launch infected-victim.exe and check if the virus was launched (logic bomb can prevent
this). If not repeat this step.
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4. Launch tester application with the path to virus.txt log file as parameter and parameter
depth set to 5.
5. Wait for the end of the tester application
6. Save virus.txt log file and virus-exceptions.txt (if any) log file outside of the virtual ma-
chine.
7. Restore snapshot.
5.3 Experiment results
Data from all results from testing are available as an attachment of this work.
This section is focused on representation and visualization of gathered data specifically on
these 5 sub-sections:
• Most used virus modules by evolution
• Average number of infection and how many times were infected all testing files
• Viruses that were created 3 or more times by evolution
• Viruses that infects 7 or more files by evolution
• Infection spreading
All previously listed sub-sections are represented and visualized separately for viruses that
infects 3 victim files and for viruses that infects 5 victim files.
5.3.1 Viruses that inflict 3 victims
5.3.1.1 Most used virus modules
In Table 7 are shown most used modules that were used by 3-file infection viruses generated by
random evolution. Specific modules types can be seen in bar plots - Figures 17,18,19.
Table 7: Most used virus modules by random evolution and 3-file infection
LogicBombs VictimSearchers Infectors Payloads
Magician2LogicBomb 35 DesktopSearcher 18 PrependInfector 107 CheersPayload 22
MagicianLogicBomb 17 StartMenuSearcher 11 CookiePayload 25
ObjLength2LogicBomb 6 TaskBarSearcher 9 GoodXYPayload 19
ObjLengthLogicBomb 20 TreeSearcher 18 IGotYouPayload 16
RandomLogicBomb 10 UserAssistSearcher 51 YRInfectedPayload 25
Time1LogicBomb 12
Time2LogicBomb 7
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Figure 17: Number of uses for each LogicBomb type by random evolution and 3-file infection
Figure 18: Number of uses for each VictimSearcher type by random evolution and 3-file infection
Figure 19: Number of uses for each Payload type by random evolution and 3-file infection
In Table 8 are shown most used modules that were used by 3-file infection viruses generated
by DE. Specific modules types can be seen in bar plots - Figures: 20,21,22.
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Table 8: Most used virus modules by DE and 3-file infection
LogicBombs VictimSearchers Infectors Payloads
Magician2LogicBomb 27 DesktopSearcher 24 PrependInfector 109 CheersPayload 13
MagicianLogicBomb 18 StartMenuSearcher 19 CookiePayload 28
ObjLength2LogicBomb 13 TaskBarSearcher 14 GoodXYPayload 30
ObjLengthLogicBomb 17 TreeSearcher 25 IGotYouPayload 19
RandomLogicBomb 12 UserAssistSearcher 27 YRInfectedPayload 19
Time1LogicBomb 13
Time2LogicBomb 9
Figure 20: Number of uses for each LogicBomb type by DE and 3-file infection
Figure 21: Number of uses for each VictimSearcher type by DE and 3-file infection
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Figure 22: Number of uses for each Payload type by DE and 3-file infection
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In Table 9 are shown most used modules that were used by 3-file infection viruses generated
by GA. Specific modules types can be seen in bar plots - Figures: 23,24,25.
Table 9: Most used virus modules by GA and 3-file infection
LogicBombs VictimSearchers Infectors Payloads
Magician2LogicBomb 52 DesktopSearcher 11 PrependInfector 129 CheersPayload 30
MagicianLogicBomb 22 StartMenuSearcher 12 CookiePayload 25
ObjLength2LogicBomb 4 TaskBarSearcher 6 GoodXYPayload 28
ObjLengthLogicBomb 16 TreeSearcher 14 IGotYouPayload 23
RandomLogicBomb 7 UserAssistSearcher 86 YRInfectedPayload 23
Time1LogicBomb 22
Time2LogicBomb 6
Figure 23: Number of uses for each LogicBomb type by GA and 3-file infection
Figure 24: Number of uses for each VictimSearcher type by GA and 3-file infection
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Figure 25: Number of uses for each Payload type by GA and 3-file infection
In Table 10 are shown most used modules that were used by 3-file infection viruses generated
by PSO. Specific modules types can be seen in bar plots - Figures: 26,27,28.
Table 10: Most used virus modules by PSO and 3-file infection
LogicBombs VictimSearchers Infectors Payloads
Magician2LogicBomb 86 DesktopSearcher 7 PrependInfector 130 CheersPayload 31
MagicianLogicBomb 13 StartMenuSearcher 7 CookiePayload 24
ObjLength2LogicBomb 2 TaskBarSearcher 6 GoodXYPayload 23
ObjLengthLogicBomb 15 TreeSearcher 8 IGotYouPayload 32
RandomLogicBomb 2 UserAssistSearcher 102 YRInfectedPayload 20
Time1LogicBomb 12
Time2LogicBomb 0
Figure 26: Number of uses for each LogicBomb type by PSO and 3-file infection
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Figure 27: Number of uses for each VictimSearcher type by PSO and 3-file infection
Figure 28: Number of uses for each Payload type by PSO and 3-file infection
In Table 11 are shown most used modules that were used by 3-file infection viruses generated
by SOMA. Specific modules types can be seen in bar plots - Figures: 29,30,31.
Figure 29: Number of uses for each LogicBomb type by SOMA and 3-file infection
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Table 11: Most used virus modules by SOMA and 3-file infection
LogicBombs VictimSearchers Infectors Payloads
Magician2LogicBomb 45 DesktopSearcher 13 PrependInfector 123 CheersPayload 22
MagicianLogicBomb 21 StartMenuSearcher 15 CookiePayload 16
ObjLength2LogicBomb 5 TaskBarSearcher 5 GoodXYPayload 30
ObjLengthLogicBomb 18 TreeSearcher 20 IGotYouPayload 26
RandomLogicBomb 12 UserAssistSearcher 70 YRInfectedPayload 29
Time1LogicBomb 14
Time2LogicBomb 8
Figure 30: Number of uses for each VictimSearcher type by SOMA and 3-file infection
Figure 31: Number of uses for each Payload type by SOMA and 3-file infection
5.3.1.2 Average number of infection and how many times were infected all testing
files
In Table 12 are showed average number of infection by evolution and how many times evolution
algorithms (including random selection of evolutionary algorithm) accomplish to infect all test
files.
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Table 12: Average number of infection by evolution and all test file infection achievements by
evolution (3-file infection viruses)
Random DE GA PSO SOMA
Average of 5 scenarios: 61.4 62 75 75 71
Number of infecting all test files: (out of 5) 2 2 5 5 3
5.3.1.3 Viruses that were created 3 or more times
In Table 13 are shown 3-file infection viruses that were created 3 or more times by randomly
selected evolution. The same can be seen in bar plot - Figure 32.
Table 13: 3-file infection viruses that were created 3 or more times by random evolution algorithm
Virus structure Number of creations
Magician2LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,CheersPayload(0,4,0,0) 7
Magician2LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,YRInfectedPayload(0,4,0,4) 6
Magician2LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,GoodXYPayload(0,4,0,2) 4
MagicianLogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,CheersPayload(1,4,0,0) 4
Magician2LogicBomb,DesktopSearcher,PrependInfector,CookiePayload(0,0,0,1) 3
ObjLengthLogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,CookiePayload(3,4,0,1) 3
Magician2LogicBomb,DesktopSearcher,PrependInfector,GoodXYPayload(0,0,0,2) 3
Magician2LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,CookiePayload(0,4,0,1) 3
Figure 32: 3-file infection viruses that were created 3 or more times by random evolution algo-
rithm
In Table 14 are shown 3-file infection viruses that were created 3 or more times by DE. The
same can be seen in bar plot - Figure 33.
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Table 14: 3-file infection viruses that were created 3 or more times by DE
Virus structure Number of creations
MagicianLogicBomb,DesktopSearcher,PrependInfector,GoodXYPayload(1,0,0,2) 4
Magician2LogicBomb,TreeSearcher,PrependInfector,CookiePayload(0,3,0,1) 4
Time1LogicBomb,TreeSearcher,PrependInfector,GoodXYPayload(5,3,0,2) 3
ObjLengthLogicBomb,DesktopSearcher,PrependInfector,YRInfectedPayload(3,0,0,4) 3
Magician2LogicBomb,DesktopSearcher,PrependInfector,CookiePayload(0,0,0,1) 3
ObjLength2LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,IGotYouPayload(2,4,0,3) 3
Magician2LogicBomb,TaskBarSearcher,PrependInfector,YRInfectedPayload(0,2,0,4) 3
MagicianLogicBomb,DesktopSearcher,PrependInfector,IGotYouPayload(1,0,0,3) 3
Figure 33: 3-file infection viruses that were created 3 or more times by DE
In Table 15 are shown 3-file infection viruses that were created 3 or more times by GA. The
same can be seen in bar plot - Figure 34.
Figure 34: 3-file infection viruses that were created 3 or more times by GA
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Table 15: 3-file infection viruses that were created 3 or more times by GA
Virus structure Number of creations
Magician2LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,CheersPayload(0,4,0,0) 10
Magician2LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,YRInfectedPayload(0,4,0,4) 7
Magician2LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,GoodXYPayload(0,4,0,2) 6
Time1LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,CheersPayload(5,4,0,0) 5
Magician2LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,CookiePayload(0,4,0,1) 5
Time1LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,IGotYouPayload(5,4,0,3) 4
MagicianLogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,CookiePayload(1,4,0,1) 4
Magician2LogicBomb,StartMenuSearcher,PrependInfector,CookiePayload(0,1,0,1) 4
Time1LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,GoodXYPayload(5,4,0,2) 4
Time2LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,GoodXYPayload(6,4,0,2) 4
Magician2LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,IGotYouPayload(0,4,0,3) 4
MagicianLogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,YRInfectedPayload(1,4,0,4) 3
ObjLengthLogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,CookiePayload(3,4,0,1) 3
Magician2LogicBomb,TreeSearcher,PrependInfector,YRInfectedPayload(0,3,0,4) 3
MagicianLogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,CheersPayload(1,4,0,0) 3
In Table 16 are shown 3-file infection viruses that were created 3 or more times by PSO. The
same can be seen in bar plot - Figure 35.
Table 16: 3-file infection viruses that were created 3 or more times by PSO
Virus structure Number of creations
Magician2LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,IGotYouPayload(0,4,0,3) 18
Magician2LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,YRInfectedPayload(0,4,0,4) 15
Magician2LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,CheersPayload(0,4,0,0) 14
Magician2LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,CookiePayload(0,4,0,1) 11
Magician2LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,GoodXYPayload(0,4,0,2) 6
ObjLengthLogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,GoodXYPayload(3,4,0,2) 5
ObjLengthLogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,IGotYouPayload(3,4,0,3) 4
MagicianLogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,GoodXYPayload(1,4,0,2) 4
Time1LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,CheersPayload(5,4,0,0) 4
MagicianLogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,CheersPayload(1,4,0,0) 3
Time1LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,GoodXYPayload(5,4,0,2) 3
Figure 35: 3-file infection viruses that were created 3 or more times by PSO
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In Table 17 are shown 3-file infection viruses that were created 3 or more times by SOMA.
The same can be seen in bar plot - Figure 36.
Table 17: 3-file infection viruses that were created 3 or more times by SOMA
Virus structure Number of creations
Magician2LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,IGotYouPayload(0,4,0,3) 6
Magician2LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,CookiePayload(0,4,0,1) 5
Magician2LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,CheersPayload(0,4,0,0) 5
Magician2LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,YRInfectedPayload(0,4,0,4) 5
Time1LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,GoodXYPayload(5,4,0,2) 5
MagicianLogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,YRInfectedPayload(1,4,0,4) 4
MagicianLogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,CookiePayload(1,4,0,1) 4
ObjLengthLogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,CookiePayload(3,4,0,1) 3
MagicianLogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,GoodXYPayload(1,4,0,2) 3
ObjLengthLogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,IGotYouPayload(3,4,0,3) 3
RandomLogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,YRInfectedPayload(4,4,0,4) 3
RandomLogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,CheersPayload(4,4,0,0) 3
Magician2LogicBomb,StartMenuSearcher,PrependInfector,YRInfectedPayload(0,1,0,4) 3
Magician2LogicBomb,StartMenuSearcher,PrependInfector,GoodXYPayload(0,1,0,2) 3
Figure 36: 3-file infection viruses that were created 3 or more times by SOMA
5.3.1.4 Viruses that infects 7 or more files
In Table 18 are shown 3-file infection viruses that infected 7 or more files by randomly selected
evolution. The same can be seen in bar plot - Figure 37.
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Table 18: 3-file infection viruses that infects 7 or more files by random evolutionary algorithm
Virus structure Number of infections
Magician2LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,CheersPayload(0,4,0,0) 21
Magician2LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,YRInfectedPayload(0,4,0,4) 16
Magician2LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,GoodXYPayload(0,4,0,2) 12
MagicianLogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,CheersPayload(1,4,0,0) 12
Magician2LogicBomb,DesktopSearcher,PrependInfector,CookiePayload(0,0,0,1) 9
ObjLengthLogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,CookiePayload(3,4,0,1) 9
Magician2LogicBomb,DesktopSearcher,PrependInfector,GoodXYPayload(0,0,0,2) 8
Magician2LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,CookiePayload(0,4,0,1) 7
Figure 37: 3-file infection viruses that infects 7 or more files by random evolutionary algorithm
In Table 19 are shown 3-file infection viruses that infected 7 or more files by DE. The same
can be seen in bar plot - Figure 38.
Table 19: 3-file infection viruses that infects 7 or more files by DE
Virus structure Number of infections
MagicianLogicBomb,DesktopSearcher,PrependInfector,GoodXYPayload(1,0,0,2) 11
Magician2LogicBomb,TreeSearcher,PrependInfector,CookiePayload(0,3,0,1) 11
Time1LogicBomb,TreeSearcher,PrependInfector,GoodXYPayload(5,3,0,2) 9
Magician2LogicBomb,TaskBarSearcher,PrependInfector,YRInfectedPayload(0,2,0,4) 9
MagicianLogicBomb,DesktopSearcher,PrependInfector,IGotYouPayload(1,0,0,3) 9
ObjLengthLogicBomb,DesktopSearcher,PrependInfector,YRInfectedPayload(3,0,0,4) 8
Magician2LogicBomb,DesktopSearcher,PrependInfector,CookiePayload(0,0,0,1) 7
ObjLength2LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,IGotYouPayload(2,4,0,3) 7
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Figure 38: 3-file infection viruses that infects 7 or more files by DE
In Table 20 are shown 3-file infection viruses that infected 7 or more files by GA. The same
can be seen in bar plot - Figure 39.
Table 20: 3-file infection viruses that infects 7 or more files by GA
Virus structure Number of infections
Magician2LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,CheersPayload(0,4,0,0) 30
Magician2LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,YRInfectedPayload(0,4,0,4) 21
Magician2LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,GoodXYPayload(0,4,0,2) 18
Time1LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,CheersPayload(5,4,0,0) 15
Magician2LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,CookiePayload(0,4,0,1) 14
MagicianLogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,CookiePayload(1,4,0,1) 12
Time1LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,GoodXYPayload(5,4,0,2) 12
Time2LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,GoodXYPayload(6,4,0,2) 12
Magician2LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,IGotYouPayload(0,4,0,3) 12
Time1LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,IGotYouPayload(5,4,0,3) 11
Magician2LogicBomb,StartMenuSearcher,PrependInfector,CookiePayload(0,1,0,1) 10
MagicianLogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,YRInfectedPayload(1,4,0,4) 9
ObjLengthLogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,CookiePayload(3,4,0,1) 9
Magician2LogicBomb,TreeSearcher,PrependInfector,YRInfectedPayload(0,3,0,4) 9
MagicianLogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,CheersPayload(1,4,0,0) 9
Figure 39: 3-file infection viruses that infects 7 or more files by GA
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In Table 21 are shown 3-file infection viruses that infected 7 or more files by PSO. The same
can be seen in bar plot - Figure 40.
Table 21: 3-file infection viruses that infects 7 or more files by PSO
Virus structure Number of infections
Magician2LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,IGotYouPayload(0,4,0,3) 53
Magician2LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,YRInfectedPayload(0,4,0,4) 43
Magician2LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,CheersPayload(0,4,0,0) 42
Magician2LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,CookiePayload(0,4,0,1) 31
Magician2LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,GoodXYPayload(0,4,0,2) 17
ObjLengthLogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,GoodXYPayload(3,4,0,2) 15
ObjLengthLogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,IGotYouPayload(3,4,0,3) 12
MagicianLogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,GoodXYPayload(1,4,0,2) 12
Time1LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,CheersPayload(5,4,0,0) 10
MagicianLogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,CheersPayload(1,4,0,0) 9
Time1LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,GoodXYPayload(5,4,0,2) 9
Figure 40: 3-file infection viruses that infects 7 or more files by PSO
In Table 22 are shown 3-file infection viruses that infected 7 or more files by SOMA. The
same can be seen in bar plot - Figure 41.
Figure 41: 3-file infection viruses that infects 7 or more files by SOMA
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Table 22: 3-file infection viruses that infects 7 or more files by SOMA
Virus structure Number of infections
Magician2LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,IGotYouPayload(0,4,0,3) 17
Magician2LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,CookiePayload(0,4,0,1) 15
Magician2LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,CheersPayload(0,4,0,0) 15
Magician2LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,YRInfectedPayload(0,4,0,4) 15
Time1LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,GoodXYPayload(5,4,0,2) 15
MagicianLogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,YRInfectedPayload(1,4,0,4) 12
MagicianLogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,CookiePayload(1,4,0,1) 12
ObjLengthLogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,CookiePayload(3,4,0,1) 9
MagicianLogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,GoodXYPayload(1,4,0,2) 9
ObjLengthLogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,IGotYouPayload(3,4,0,3) 9
Magician2LogicBomb,StartMenuSearcher,PrependInfector,YRInfectedPayload(0,1,0,4) 9
Magician2LogicBomb,StartMenuSearcher,PrependInfector,GoodXYPayload(0,1,0,2) 9
RandomLogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,YRInfectedPayload(4,4,0,4) 8
5.3.1.5 Infection visualization
For infection visualization were generated files in Gephi (.gdf) format. All this files are available
as attachment in data folder of this work. For visualization of 3-file infect virus was chosen data
"data3-random-1.gdf" which means:
• data3 - data from virus that is 3-file infection
• random - evolutionary algorithm is randomly selected
• 1 - it was 1st out of 5 iterations of scenario
For visualization then were created 5 images showing testing files on file system:
• Groups with node names (Figure 42) - shows application group (Program/Game/Work/-
Download) and application name
• Groups (Figure 43) - shows application group (Program/Game/Work/Download)
• Spreading heat-map (Figure 44) - shows infection progression
• VictimSearchers (Figure 45) - shows which type of VictimSearcher was used by node (virus)
to infect others
• Evolution (Figure 46) - shows which evolution created node (virus)
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Figure 42: Application group distinguished by color and application names (data3-random-1.gdf)
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Figure 43: Application group distinguished by color (data3-random-1.gdf)
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Figure 44: Heat-map of applications infections. Darker nodes were infected earlier. Green node
is "infected-victim.exe" first infected file. (data3-random-1.gdf)
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Figure 45: Node (virus) VictimSearcher distinguished by color (data3-random-1.gdf)
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Figure 46: By which evolutionary algorithm was node (virus) created distinguished by color
(data3-random-1.gdf)
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5.3.2 Viruses that inflict 5 victims
5.3.2.1 Most used virus modules
In Table 23 are shown most used modules that were used by 5-file infection viruses generated
by random evolution. Specific modules types can be seen in bar plots - Figures 47,48,49.
Table 23: Most used virus modules by random evolution and 5-file infection
LogicBombs VictimSearchers Infectors Payloads
Magician2LogicBomb 39 DesktopSearcher 6 PrependInfector 79 CheersPayload 17
MagicianLogicBomb 12 StartMenuSearcher 12 CookiePayload 20
ObjLength2LogicBomb 8 TaskBarSearcher 7 GoodXYPayload 14
ObjLengthLogicBomb 3 TreeSearcher 11 IGotYouPayload 11
RandomLogicBomb 7 UserAssistSearcher 43 YRInfectedPayload 17
Time1LogicBomb 6
Time2LogicBomb 4
Figure 47: Number of uses for each LogicBomb type by random evolution and 5-file infection
Figure 48: Number of uses for each VictimSearcher type by random evolution and 5-file infection
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Figure 49: Number of uses for each Payload type by random evolution and 5-file infection
In Table 24 are shown most used modules that were used by 5-file infection viruses generated
by DE. Specific modules types can be seen in bar plots - Figures: 50,51,52.
Table 24: Most used virus modules by DE and 5-file infection
LogicBombs VictimSearchers Infectors Payloads
Magician2LogicBomb 21 DesktopSearcher 13 PrependInfector 84 CheersPayload 26
MagicianLogicBomb 12 StartMenuSearcher 15 CookiePayload 18
ObjLength2LogicBomb 13 TaskBarSearcher 21 GoodXYPayload 17
ObjLengthLogicBomb 8 TreeSearcher 13 IGotYouPayload 14
RandomLogicBomb 9 UserAssistSearcher 22 YRInfectedPayload 9
Time1LogicBomb 9
Time2LogicBomb 12
Figure 50: Number of uses for each LogicBomb type by DE and 5-file infection
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Figure 51: Number of uses for each VictimSearcher type by DE and 5-file infection
Figure 52: Number of uses for each Payload type by DE and 5-file infection
In Table 25 are shown most used modules that were used by 5-file infection viruses generated
by GA. Specific modules types can be seen in bar plots - Figures: 53,54,55.
Figure 53: Number of uses for each LogicBomb type by GA and 5-file infection
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Table 25: Most used virus modules by GA and 5-file infection
LogicBombs VictimSearchers Infectors Payloads
Magician2LogicBomb 31 DesktopSearcher 5 PrependInfector 79 CheersPayload 19
MagicianLogicBomb 7 StartMenuSearcher 6 CookiePayload 15
ObjLength2LogicBomb 1 TaskBarSearcher 7 GoodXYPayload 16
ObjLengthLogicBomb 10 TreeSearcher 7 IGotYouPayload 15
RandomLogicBomb 6 UserAssistSearcher 54 YRInfectedPayload 14
Time1LogicBomb 13
Time2LogicBomb 11
Figure 54: Number of uses for each VictimSearcher type by GA and 5-file infection
Figure 55: Number of uses for each Payload type by GA and 5-file infection
In Table 26 are shown most used modules that were used by 5-file infection viruses generated
by PSO. Specific modules types can be seen in bar plots - Figures: 56,57,58.
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Table 26: Most used virus modules by PSO and 5-file infection
LogicBombs VictimSearchers Infectors Payloads
Magician2LogicBomb 47 DesktopSearcher 1 PrependInfector 77 CheersPayload 12
MagicianLogicBomb 13 StartMenuSearcher 2 CookiePayload 17
ObjLength2LogicBomb 0 TaskBarSearcher 2 GoodXYPayload 16
ObjLengthLogicBomb 11 TreeSearcher 5 IGotYouPayload 13
RandomLogicBomb 1 UserAssistSearcher 67 YRInfectedPayload 19
Time1LogicBomb 5
Time2LogicBomb 0
Figure 56: Number of uses for each LogicBomb type by PSO and 5-file infection
Figure 57: Number of uses for each VictimSearcher type by PSO and 5-file infection
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Figure 58: Number of uses for each Payload type by PSO and 5-file infection
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In Table 27 are shown most used modules that were used by 5-file infection viruses generated
by SOMA. Specific modules types can be seen in bar plots - Figures: 59,60,61.
Table 27: Most used virus modules by SOMA and 5-file infection
LogicBombs VictimSearchers Infectors Payloads
Magician2LogicBomb 31 DesktopSearcher 4 PrependInfector 78 CheersPayload 20
MagicianLogicBomb 14 StartMenuSearcher 9 CookiePayload 17
ObjLength2LogicBomb 4 TaskBarSearcher 5 GoodXYPayload 14
ObjLengthLogicBomb 7 TreeSearcher 10 IGotYouPayload 9
RandomLogicBomb 6 UserAssistSearcher 50 YRInfectedPayload 18
Time1LogicBomb 9
Time2LogicBomb 7
Figure 59: Number of uses for each LogicBomb type by SOMA and 5-file infection
Figure 60: Number of uses for each VictimSearcher type by SOMA and 5-file infection
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Figure 61: Number of uses for each Payload type by SOMA and 5-file infection
5.3.2.2 Average number of infection and how many times were infected all testing
files
In Table 28 are showed average number of infection by evolution and how many times evolution
algorithms (including random selection of evolutionary algorithm) accomplish to infect all test
files.
Table 28: Average number of infection by evolution and all test file infection achievements by
evolution (5-file infection viruses)
Random DE GA PSO SOMA
Average of 5 scenarios: 75 75 75 75 75
Number of infecting all test files: (out of 5) 5 5 5 5 5
5.3.2.3 Viruses that were created 3 or more times
In Table 29 are shown 5-file infection viruses that were created 3 or more times by randomly
selected evolution. The same can be seen in bar plot - Figure 62.
Table 29: 5-file infection viruses that were created 3 or more times by random evolution algorithm
Virus structure Number of creations
Magician2LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,YRInfectedPayload(0,4,0,4) 7
Magician2LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,CheersPayload(0,4,0,0) 5
Magician2LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,CookiePayload(0,4,0,1) 4
ObjLength2LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,CookiePayload(2,4,0,1) 4
Magician2LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,GoodXYPayload(0,4,0,2) 3
Magician2LogicBomb,TreeSearcher,PrependInfector,YRInfectedPayload(0,3,0,4) 3
Magician2LogicBomb,TaskBarSearcher,PrependInfector,YRInfectedPayload(0,2,0,4) 3
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Figure 62: 5-file infection viruses that were created 3 or more times by random evolution algo-
rithm
In Table 30 are shown 5-file infection viruses that were created 3 or more times by DE. The
same can be seen in bar plot - Figure 63.
Table 30: 5-file infection viruses that were created 3 or more times by DE
Virus structure Number of creations
ObjLengthLogicBomb,TaskBarSearcher,PrependInfector,CheersPayload(3,2,0,0) 4
Magician2LogicBomb,TaskBarSearcher,PrependInfector,CheersPayload(0,2,0,0) 3
Time2LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,CookiePayload(6,4,0,1) 3
Figure 63: 5-file infection viruses that were created 3 or more times by DE
In Table 31 are shown 5-file infection viruses that were created 3 or more times by GA. The
same can be seen in bar plot - Figure 64.
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Table 31: 5-file infection viruses that were created 3 or more times by GA
Virus structure Number of creations
Magician2LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,CookiePayload(0,4,0,1) 6
Magician2LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,CheersPayload(0,4,0,0) 5
Magician2LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,GoodXYPayload(0,4,0,2) 3
Time2LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,CheersPayload(6,4,0,0) 3
ObjLengthLogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,CheersPayload(3,4,0,0) 3
ObjLengthLogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,GoodXYPayload(3,4,0,2) 3
Time2LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,YRInfectedPayload(6,4,0,4) 3
Figure 64: 5-file infection viruses that were created 3 or more times by GA
In Table 32 are shown 5-file infection viruses that were created 3 or more times by PSO. The
same can be seen in bar plot - Figure 65.
Table 32: 5-file infection viruses that were created 3 or more times by PSO
Virus structure Number of creations
Magician2LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,YRInfectedPayload(0,4,0,4) 11
Magician2LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,CheersPayload(0,4,0,0) 9
Magician2LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,GoodXYPayload(0,4,0,2) 9
Magician2LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,IGotYouPayload(0,4,0,3) 7
MagicianLogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,CookiePayload(1,4,0,1) 4
MagicianLogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,YRInfectedPayload(1,4,0,4) 4
Magician2LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,CookiePayload(0,4,0,1) 4
ObjLengthLogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,CookiePayload(3,4,0,1) 4
MagicianLogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,IGotYouPayload(1,4,0,3) 3
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Figure 65: 5-file infection viruses that were created 3 or more times by PSO
In Table 33 are shown 5-file infection viruses that were created 3 or more times by SOMA.
The same can be seen in bar plot - Figure 66.
Table 33: 5-file infection viruses that were created 3 or more times by SOMA
Virus structure Number of creations
Magician2LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,GoodXYPayload(0,4,0,2) 4
Magician2LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,CookiePayload(0,4,0,1) 4
MagicianLogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,YRInfectedPayload(1,4,0,4) 4
ObjLengthLogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,YRInfectedPayload(3,4,0,4) 4
Magician2LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,YRInfectedPayload(0,4,0,4) 4
Time1LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,CookiePayload(5,4,0,1) 4
Time2LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,CookiePayload(6,4,0,1) 3
MagicianLogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,CheersPayload(1,4,0,0) 3
Magician2LogicBomb,DesktopSearcher,PrependInfector,CheersPayload(0,0,0,0) 3
Figure 66: 5-file infection viruses that were created 3 or more times by SOMA
5.3.2.4 Viruses that infects 7 or more files
In Table 34 are shown 5-file infection viruses that infected 7 or more files by randomly selected
evolution. The same can be seen in bar plot - Figure 67.
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Table 34: 5-file infection viruses that infects 7 or more files by random evolutionary algorithm
Virus structure Number of infections
Magician2LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,YRInfectedPayload(0,4,0,4) 31
Magician2LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,CheersPayload(0,4,0,0) 25
ObjLength2LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,CookiePayload(2,4,0,1) 20
Magician2LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,CookiePayload(0,4,0,1) 18
Magician2LogicBomb,TreeSearcher,PrependInfector,YRInfectedPayload(0,3,0,4) 15
Magician2LogicBomb,TaskBarSearcher,PrependInfector,YRInfectedPayload(0,2,0,4) 15
Magician2LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,GoodXYPayload(0,4,0,2) 12
Time2LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,CookiePayload(6,4,0,1) 10
MagicianLogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,CookiePayload(1,4,0,1) 10
MagicianLogicBomb,TreeSearcher,PrependInfector,CheersPayload(1,3,0,0) 10
Magician2LogicBomb,StartMenuSearcher,PrependInfector,GoodXYPayload(0,1,0,2) 10
MagicianLogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,IGotYouPayload(1,4,0,3) 10
Magician2LogicBomb,StartMenuSearcher,PrependInfector,CookiePayload(0,1,0,1) 10
Time1LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,CookiePayload(5,4,0,1) 8
RandomLogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,GoodXYPayload(4,4,0,2) 8
Figure 67: 5-file infection viruses that infects 7 or more files by random evolutionary algorithm
In Table 35 are shown 5-file infection viruses that infected 7 or more files by DE. The same
can be seen in bar plot - Figure 68.
Figure 68: 5-file infection viruses that infects 7 or more files by DE
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Table 35: 5-file infection viruses that infects 7 or more files by DE
Virus structure Number of infections
ObjLengthLogicBomb,TaskBarSearcher,PrependInfector,CheersPayload(3,2,0,0) 19
Magician2LogicBomb,TaskBarSearcher,PrependInfector,CheersPayload(0,2,0,0) 15
Time2LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,CookiePayload(6,4,0,1) 15
Time2LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,IGotYouPayload(6,4,0,3) 10
RandomLogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,CookiePayload(4,4,0,1) 10
Magician2LogicBomb,TaskBarSearcher,PrependInfector,GoodXYPayload(0,2,0,2) 10
MagicianLogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,GoodXYPayload(1,4,0,2) 10
ObjLength2LogicBomb,TreeSearcher,PrependInfector,CheersPayload(2,3,0,0) 10
Time1LogicBomb,TreeSearcher,PrependInfector,CheersPayload(5,3,0,0) 9
Time2LogicBomb,TaskBarSearcher,PrependInfector,CheersPayload(6,2,0,0) 7
In Table 36 are shown 5-file infection viruses that infected 7 or more files by GA. The same
can be seen in bar plot - Figure 69.
Table 36: 5-file infection viruses that infects 7 or more files by GA
Virus structure Number of infections
Magician2LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,CookiePayload(0,4,0,1) 30
Magician2LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,CheersPayload(0,4,0,0) 21
Magician2LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,GoodXYPayload(0,4,0,2) 15
Time2LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,CheersPayload(6,4,0,0) 15
ObjLengthLogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,CheersPayload(3,4,0,0) 15
Time2LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,YRInfectedPayload(6,4,0,4) 15
ObjLengthLogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,GoodXYPayload(3,4,0,2) 14
Magician2LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,IGotYouPayload(0,4,0,3) 10
Time2LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,IGotYouPayload(6,4,0,3) 10
RandomLogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,IGotYouPayload(4,4,0,3) 10
Magician2LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,YRInfectedPayload(0,4,0,4) 10
Time1LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,IGotYouPayload(5,4,0,3) 10
MagicianLogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,IGotYouPayload(1,4,0,3) 10
MagicianLogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,YRInfectedPayload(1,4,0,4) 10
Time1LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,CheersPayload(5,4,0,0) 8
Figure 69: 5-file infection viruses that infects 7 or more files by GA
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In Table 37 are shown 5-file infection viruses that infected 7 or more files by PSO. The same
can be seen in bar plot - Figure 70.
Table 37: 5-file infection viruses that infects 7 or more files by PSO
Virus structure Number of infections
Magician2LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,YRInfectedPayload(0,4,0,4) 55
Magician2LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,CheersPayload(0,4,0,0) 45
Magician2LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,GoodXYPayload(0,4,0,2) 36
Magician2LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,IGotYouPayload(0,4,0,3) 35
MagicianLogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,CookiePayload(1,4,0,1) 20
MagicianLogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,YRInfectedPayload(1,4,0,4) 20
Magician2LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,CookiePayload(0,4,0,1) 20
ObjLengthLogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,CookiePayload(3,4,0,1) 20
MagicianLogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,IGotYouPayload(1,4,0,3) 15
MagicianLogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,CheersPayload(1,4,0,0) 10
Magician2LogicBomb,TreeSearcher,PrependInfector,GoodXYPayload(0,3,0,2) 10
ObjLengthLogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,GoodXYPayload(3,4,0,2) 10
Time1LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,GoodXYPayload(5,4,0,2) 10
Magician2LogicBomb,TreeSearcher,PrependInfector,CookiePayload(0,3,0,1) 9
Figure 70: 5-file infection viruses that infects 7 or more files by PSO
In Table 38 are shown 5-file infection viruses that infected 7 or more files by SOMA. The
same can be seen in bar plot - Figure 71.
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Table 38: 5-file infection viruses that infects 7 or more files by SOMA
Virus structure Number of infections
Magician2LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,GoodXYPayload(0,4,0,2) 20
Magician2LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,CookiePayload(0,4,0,1) 20
MagicianLogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,YRInfectedPayload(1,4,0,4) 20
Magician2LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,YRInfectedPayload(0,4,0,4) 20
ObjLengthLogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,YRInfectedPayload(3,4,0,4) 18
Time1LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,CookiePayload(5,4,0,1) 16
Time2LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,CookiePayload(6,4,0,1) 15
MagicianLogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,CheersPayload(1,4,0,0) 15
Magician2LogicBomb,DesktopSearcher,PrependInfector,CheersPayload(0,0,0,0) 15
Magician2LogicBomb,StartMenuSearcher,PrependInfector,CheersPayload(0,1,0,0) 10
Magician2LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,CheersPayload(0,4,0,0) 10
ObjLength2LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,GoodXYPayload(2,4,0,2) 10
Magician2LogicBomb,TreeSearcher,PrependInfector,IGotYouPayload(0,3,0,3) 10
Time1LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,GoodXYPayload(5,4,0,2) 10
MagicianLogicBomb,TreeSearcher,PrependInfector,IGotYouPayload(1,3,0,3) 10
RandomLogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,CheersPayload(4,4,0,0) 8
Time2LogicBomb,UserAssistSearcher,PrependInfector,IGotYouPayload(6,4,0,3) 7
Figure 71: 5-file infection viruses that infects 7 or more files by SOMA
5.3.2.5 Infection visualization
5.3.2.6 Infection visualization
For infection visualization were generated files in Gephi (.gdf) format. All this files are available
as attachment in data folder of this work. For visualization of 5-file infect virus was chosen data
"data5-random-1.gdf" which means:
• data3 - data from virus that is 5-file infection
• random - evolutionary algorithm is randomly selected
• 1 - it was 1st out of 5 iterations of scenario
For visualization then were created 5 images showing testing files on file system:
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• Groups with node names (Figure 72) - shows application group (Program/Game/Work/-
Download) and application name
• Groups (Figure 73) - shows application group (Program/Game/Work/Download)
• Spreading heat-map (Figure 74) - shows infection progression
• VictimSearchers (Figure 75) - shows which type of VictimSearcher was used by node (virus)
to infect others
• Evolution (Figure 76) - shows which evolution created node (virus)
Figure 72: Application group distinguished by color and application names (data5-random-1.gdf)
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Figure 73: Application group distinguished by color (data5-random-1.gdf)
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Figure 74: Heat-map of applications infections. Darker nodes were infected earlier. Green node
is "infected-victim.exe" first infected file. (data5-random-1.gdf)
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Figure 75: Node (virus) VictimSearcher distinguished by color (data5-random-1.gdf)
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Figure 76: By which evolutionary algorithm was node (virus) created distinguished by color
(data5-random-1.gdf)
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6 Conclusion
The aim of this master thesis are 3 main things: getting the knowledge how viruses (especially
metamorphic) and evolutionary algorithms, make functional evolvable virus and perform exper-
iment with created virus. All these thing were done and are described in this text part of the
master thesis.
In the first part of this master thesis are described principles how in general evolutionary
algorithms works and what they needed to work. There are also described specific algorithms
that were chosen to implementation in this work more in detail and with supplementation of
pseudo-code. Next are described various types of malware with description what they do. In
the same part are described virus defense techniques with brief description too. The last part
of theoretical part is description of performed experiments with using of evolvable malware or
evolvable algorithms to create malware or its functionality.
The second part is focused on practical making of evolvable malware. There are description
of individual modules of the created virus as well description of techniques that are used by
these modules. In this section is also described process of deployment of virus and highlighted
things that needs to be done for successful deployment.
The third part is focused on experiment that was done with created virus. There is described
the testing environment, the testing scenario and the course of the experiment in depth. Also
there is described application that was created to help automate testing process. Next this
section contains results of performed experiment in the form of tables, graphs and pictures.
Overall, I consider this work as beneficial to my person. It has expanded my insight into
how malware works, what techniques it use and how it spread in controlled virtual environment.
110
References
[1] SZOR, Peter. Počítačové viry: analýza útoku a obrana. 1. Brno: Zoner Press, 2006. Encyk-
lopedie Zoner Press. ISBN 80-868-1504-8.
[2] NOREEN, Sadia, Shafaq MURTAZA, M. Zubair SHAFIQ and Muddassar FAROOQ.
Evolvable malware. Proceedings of the 11th Annual conference on Genetic and evolu-
tionary computation - GECCO ’09. New York, New York, USA: ACM Press, 2009,
2009, , 1569-1576. DOI: 10.1145/1569901.1570111. ISBN 9781605583259. Available from:
http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfm?doid=1569901.1570111
[3] CANI, Andrea, Marco GAUDESI, Ernesto SANCHEZ, Giovanni SQUILLERO and Alberto
TONDA. Towards automated malware creation. Proceedings of the 29th Annual ACM Sym-
posium on Applied Computing - SAC ’14 [online]. New York, New York, USA: ACM Press,
2014, 2014, , 157-160. DOI: 10.1145/2554850.2555157. ISBN 9781450324694. Available from:
http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?doid=2554850.2555157
[4] BABAK BASHARI, Rad, Maslin MASROM and Suhaimi IBRAHIM. Camouflage in mal-
ware: from encryption to metamorphism. International Journal of Computer Science and
Network Security. 2012, 12(8), 74-83.
[5] POLI, Riccardo, James KENNEDY, Tim BLACKWELL. Particle swarm optimization.
Swarm Intelligence. 2007, 1(1), 33-57. DOI: 10.1007/s11721-007-0002-0. ISSN 1935-3812.
Available from: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11721-007-0002-0
[6] KENNEDY, James. Particle Swarm Optimization. Encyclopedia of Machine Learning.
Boston, MA: Springer US, 2011, , 760-766. DOI: 10.1007/978-0-387-30164-8. ISBN 978-
0-387-30768-8.
[7] ZELINKA, Ivan, Zuzana OPLATKOVÁ, Miloš ŠEDA, Pavel OŠMERA and František VČE-
LAŘ. Evoluční výpočetní techniky: principy a aplikace. 1. Praha: BEN - technická liter-
atura, 2009. ISBN 978-80-7300-218-3.
[8] NACHENBERG, Carey. Behavior Blocking: The Next Step in Anti-Virus Protection
[online]. Symantec Corporation: Symantec Corporation, 2002 [cit. 2019-01-27]. Avail-
able from: https://www.symantec.com/connect/articles/behavior-blocking-next-step-anti-
virus-protection
[9] History of malicious programs [online]. [cit. 2019-03-27]. Available from:
https://encyclopedia.kaspersky.com/knowledge/history-of-malicious-programs/
[10] Year 1988 [online]. [cit. 2019-03-27]. Available from:
https://encyclopedia.kaspersky.com/knowledge/year-1988/
111
[11] KONSTANTINOU, Evgenios. Metamorphic Virus: Analysis and Detection [on-
line]. Royal Holloway, University of London, 2008 [cit. 2019-04-02]. Available from:
https://www.csee.umbc.edu/courses/undergraduate/426/fall14/lectures/l07/RHUL-MA-
2008-02.pdf. Technical Report. Royal Holloway, University of London. Supervisor Stephen
Wolthusen.
112
A The list of the attachments
1. Visual Studio project of created virus
2. Visual Studio project of FirstVirusInfector application
3. Visual studio project of Tester application
4. virus.zip archive which contains files that are used in the last version of the virus (for
showing file hierarchy inside archive)
5. Gathered data from the experiment
6. Microsoft Excel file with metric for computing modules distance (distanceMatrix.xlsx)
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